

Insights into the Syntax and Pragmatics of Exclamations and Other Expressive/ Emotional Utterances

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1-Introduction:

In linguistic literature there are many discussions and descriptions of linguistic phenomena such as *expressive utterances, exclamatory utterances, expressive sentences, exclamations, exclamatives, and expressive speech acts*. Linguists have observed that there are emotionally triggered utterances in most languages, but there seems to be no consensus regarding which terminology to use when discussing the phenomena in question (Beijer, 2003:2). Neither do the phenomena seem properly defined. In sum, there is a need for better definitions of the terms used, and in order to produce better definitions we have to acquire a better understanding of the phenomena at hand. This paper is an attempt at improving the present situation.

However, regardless of terminology and linguistic labeling, most linguists are aware of the fact that utterances like the following exist in English:

1. What a devil of a name (Shaw 1941:24)
2. How very curious! (ibid)
3. What scum we are (Miller 1965:63)
4. That I have something to do with this monstrosity (ibid)
5. Oh, won't that be something (ibid)
6. But he was such a terrible referee (Pinter 1993:66)

It is not controversial to claim that there are exclamatory utterances among the examples above. The problem is, however, to distinguish between expressive/ emotional utterances in general, and the type of utterances often called *exclamatives*. The term *exclamatives* is often used to refer to a specific sentence/ clause type on par with the three clause types *declaratives, interrogatives* and *imperatives*, while other linguists consider the *exclamatives* to be a minor sentence/ clause type.

Quirk et al. (1985), for instance, use the term *exclamative* to refer to a grammatical category, i.e. a specific clause type, while they use the term *exclamation* to refer to the logical or semantic status of an utterance. This means that in Quirk et al.'s terminology some *exclamations* are realized by exclamatives, while some are not.

Radford (1997:506) defines an *exclamative* as "a type of structure used to exclaim surprise, delight, annoyance, etc." and goes on to say that the English syntax, the term is restricted mostly to clauses beginning with wh-exclamative words like *what!* or *how!*. The use of word structure seems to indicate that he regards the exclamative as a syntactic phenomenon, whereas Rosengren (1997) and Beijer (2003) argue that the exclamative is a pragmatic phenomenon.

2-Aim and hypotheses:

Apart from arguing for the position that the term *exclamative* does not refer to a syntactic phenomenon, but to a pragmatic one, the main aim of this paper is to separate what has been called exclamatives from other kinds of expressive/ emotional utterances. Related to the main aim is the question of what it is that makes linguists recognize an utterance as expressive/ emotional utterance. There must be something that distinguishes an ordinary declarative clause used assertively from the same clause used as an expressive/ emotive utterance, for instance as an exclamative. Following Beijer (2003) this paper hypothesizes that:

1. There exists an exclamative speech act with the following features or characteristics:
 - Expressing strong positive or negative emotions concerning a specific state of affairs.
 - Containing a scalar item which may be explicit or inferable.
 - Expressing a deviation from a norm through a generalized implicature resulting from an inference process, triggered by emphatic stress. Beijer(2003)

This implies that the term *exclamative* does not refer to a clause type, but to declaratives or interrogatives mapped onto speech acts in a non-default way.

2. There are other expressive/emotional utterances, lacking at least one of the features described in (1), but which are distinguishable from ordinary assertions through intonation and through the contexts in which they are uttered.
3. The types of utterances described in (1) and (2) can be separated from each other syntactically as well as in items of speech act theory.

4. The types of utterances described in(1) and (2) are different from Searle's *expressives* in that they make use of two pragmatic sub-modules, (illocutionary structure) and (information structure), while Searle's *expressives* only make use of one, namely (illocutionary structure).

3-Material:

To get illustrative examples of the linguistic phenomena at hand, the paper has compiled a corpus consisting of drama texts in English (for complete list of the drama texts included in the corpus, see the list of the references at the end of the paper).

The paper extracted all utterances in the corpus followed by exclamation marks, except imperatives, following Bolinger (1989:249) who states that "in the broadest sense, exclamations are thus anything at the end of which one would put an exclamation mark. This of course is circular, but it does not give a basis for searching out a corpus of examples. "

4-Previous accounts:

Most grammarians have chosen to describe exclamations or exclamatives as either one of the four major clause types on par with declarative, interrogative, and imperative, or as a minor clause type. This is not surprising since utterances lacking inversion, beginning with *what a* or *how*, do not function in the same way as ordinary declaratives or interrogatives. However, that declarative clauses, for instance, can be used to fulfil many different functions in natural languages, i.e. there is no one-to-one relation between language form and language function. Consequently, the exclamative need not be a clause type, but may instead be a pragmatic phenomenon, a claim supported by the fact that those who consider exclamative/ exclamation to be a sentence type(e.g. Quirk et al. 1972, 1985) have to introduce minor sentence types having the same exclamatory functions as the sentences they call exclamative (Beijer2003:3).

Quirk et al. (1972) recognize four major classes into which simple sentences may be divided, and the division seems to have been made on the basis of (syntactic) form and (pragmatic) function:

- (1) *Statements*, i.e. sentences in which the subject is always present and generally precedes the verb, such as *John will speak to the boss today*.
- (2) *Questions*, i.e. sentences marked by one of the following three criteria:
 - a) The placing of the operator in front of the subject, as in *Will John speak to the boss today?*

- b) The initial positioning of a *wh*-element, as in *Who will John speak to?*
- c) Rising question intonation: *You will speak to the boss?*
- (3) *Commands*, i.e. sentences which normally have no overt grammatical subject, and whose verb is in the imperative mood, e.g. *speak to the boss today!*
- (4) *Exclamations*, i.e. sentences which have an initial phrase introduced by *what* or *how*, without inversion of subject and operator, e.g. *What nice clothes she wears.*

In their later work Quirk et al. (1985) do not make a difference between clauses and simple sentences. They recognize four grammatical types of sentences or clauses: *declarative* (clauses/sentences), *interrogative imperatives* (clauses/sentences), and *exclamative* (clauses/sentences). They go on to say that there are four discourse functions associated with the four clause/ sentence types, namely *statements*, *questions*, *directives* (corresponding to commands above) and *exclamations*.

However, Quirk et al. (1972) recognize other constructions that can be used as exclamations. They discuss *exclamatory questions*, like *Hasn't she grown!* and *Has she grown!* And saying that they are (interrogative) questions in form and exclamatives by function.

Radford (1997) recognizes the same types of clauses/sentences as Quirk et al. (1985) do namely, *declarative*, *imperative*, and *exclamative*. Sadock & Zwicky (1985), on the other hand, suggest that there are three major sentence types *declarative*, *interrogative*, and *imperative*, and some minor sentence types such as *exclamations*, *imprecatives*, and *optatives*. It may be important to notice that Sadock&Zwicky (1985) do not discuss clause types, but sentence types.

Reis (1999) uses the term *syntactic sentence types* as apposed to so-called sentence types. She states that there are three syntactic sentence types: *declarative*, which are characterized by the syntactic feature [-wh], *interrogative* which are [+wh], and *imperatives* which have the syntactic feature [+imp]. These syntactic features [-+wh] and [-+imp] are carriers of sentence mood and the sentence moods are thus *declarative* sentence mood, *interrogative* sentence mood, and *imperative* sentence mood. All clauses are specified for sentence mood. Platzack & Rosengren (1998) state that all their functional meanings/illocutionary use potentials which can be derived on the bases of the three syntactic sentence moods plus the interpretively relevant properties of the additional (structural, lexical, prosodic etc) elements involved. This view is developed and adapted by Beijer (2003:5) and this is the view followed in this paper.

4.1- The standard theory of speech acts:

A speech act is created when speaker/writer(S) makes an utterance (U) to hearer (H) in context (C). The various speech acts are distinguished by a number of dimensions, namely *illocutionary point*, *expressed psychological states*, and *direction of fit between words and the world*. (Searle, 1975).

The dimension *illocutionary point* concerns the purpose or aim of a speech act (e.g. the point of *directives* is getting the hearer to do something). This dimension has five values, corresponding to the five basic speech act types, called *the assertive point*, *the directive point*, *the commissive point*, *the expressive point*, and *the declarative point*.

The dimension expressed psychological states is related to Grice's *Maxim of Quality* (Grice 1989:27), i.e. there has to be a match between the speaker's psychological state and the content of what he expresses if the speech act is to be successful.

The *direction of fit between words and the world* (e.g. Vandervaken 1998:172-173) concerns the relation between the words uttered and the world they relate. According to Searle (1969) there are five speech acts, which show a group of directions that fit certain characteristics (see Searle 1969).

4.2- A Modification of Searle's theory of speech acts:

Brandt et al. (1992) distinguish four kinds of direct speech acts: *representations*, *regulations*, *expressives*, and *declarations*. The speech act *representations* has two subtypes, *assertions* and *questions* and this is a deviation from the standard classification, since the problematic speech act type *question*, has been analyzed as directive by Searle and his successors (cf. Searle 1969:69, Searle & Vanderveken 1985:199).

In Brandt et. al (1998) Searle's *commissive* and *directive* are grouped together under *regulations*; a speech act type which here comprises all interactional speech act types. The defining criteria for this speech act type are the following variables:

1. Who(s or h) wants the event to happen?
2. Who(s or h) decides who of them is acting?
3. Who(s or h) acts?

According to Rosengren (1997) the difference between a *command* and a *request* is that in the case of a command, it is the speaker who is deciding and the hearer who is acting, and in the case of request, it is the hearer who both decides and acts. Regulations show world-to-word direction of fit.

The speech act *expressives* requires a performative expression. The reason that performative expression such as *welcome* or *thank* is required is, according to Brandt et al. (1992), that no expression sentence type exists and that referring proposition of the embedded clause only refers to an event,

concerning which the speaker has certain emotions. What he feels must be explicitly stated in the matrix clause. As in Searle's system, *expressives* have no direction of fit. *Declarations*, finally, are defined in the same way in Brandt et al.'s system as they are defined in Searle's system.

Beijer (2003:7) states that *expressive/emotional utterances* that is, *exclamatives* and other expressive/emotional utterances that do not belong to the speech act *expressives* are problematic, since they do not seem to belong to any of these four speech act-types. Rosengren (1997) argues that exclamatives are different from standard illocutions, since they are direct expressive/ emotional expressions, and do not propositionalize their emotional meaning in the way expressive do. They are somehow related to Searle's/ Brandt et al. expressives, but they are likely to constitute an illocutionary act of their own. This act, according to Rosengren (1997), is much closer to grammar than the usual direct and indirect speech acts.

The paper will adopt Brandt et al's (1992) speech act system, since their system has a certain appeal, or as asserted by Beijer(2003) is more up-to-date than Searle's, and, last but not least, has been proved to be suitable for further research with in a modular approach.

4.3- Speech acts and sentence types, a minimalists-modular approach:

In contemporary works within generative grammar (Chomsky,1995), the following language model is standardly assumed:

Lexicon

Spell-out

(*Logical form*)

(*Phonetic form*)

Beijer (2003:8)

Logical form is the interface between grammar and the conceptual-intentional system, i.e. the cognitive process dealing with the meaning of utterances. Phonetic form is the interface between grammar and articulatory-perceptual systems.

Rosengren (1997) proposes a similar model with one difference that is the presence of two pragmatic sub-modules (Illocution structure) at the logical form and (information structure) at the phonetic form.

Lexicon

Spell-out

Logical form

phonetic form

Illocution structure

information structure

5- Emotives and Exclamatives:

There is a difference between expressive/emotional utterances in general exclamatives. Beijer(2003:9) states that The term *emotional/expressive utterances* refers to any utterance in which the speaker in question is emotionally involved, and in which this involvement is linguistically expressed by means of intonation or by the use of performative expressions. No particular syntactic features have to make an utterance acceptable as an expressive/ emotional utterance. Instead, other linguistic modules, as well as context, are involved. Rosengren (1997) uses the term *expressive/ emotional utterance* as a cover term for all utterances that are emotionally triggered.

Beijer (2003:9) asserts that it is important to make *exclamatives* be distinguishable from emotional utterances in general. Rosengren (1997) shows that the exclamatory/ emotive function of exclamatives is triggered by sentence mood. Propositional properties, and stress patterns. The proposition is described as a predicate inducing a scale of some sort: *degree or quality*. Generally, a speaker is expected to produce a proposition of a certain value on some scale, that is, a proposition in accordance with the norm in question. However, the speaker may do some deviations from the norm, using either a declarative clause (7) or a negated interrogative clause(8).

7. How fast she can run! (Quirk et al. 1985:15.7)

8. isn't she beautiful! (Rosengren, 1997)

In example (7) the speaker expresses his/her feelings concerning the fact that the female in question is able to run very fast, and in example (8) the female in question is not only beautiful, but beautiful to a high degree on the scale of beauty.(unless it is uttered ironically).

Rosengren's pragmatic definition of the exclamative seems plausible, at least in the case of the standard exclamative beginning with *how* or *what*. Rosengren (1997) points out, however, that exclamatives consisting of *that*-clause are slightly different the exclamatives described. A *that*-clause denotes

a real or hypothetical state of affairs, and when using a *that*-clause exclamatorily, the speaker in question considers the existence of the state-of-affairs denoted by the *that* clause to be a deviation from a certain norm. Exclamative *that*-clauses need thus not have a predicate inducing a scale (11), but they may have one, as in (12), and then it is often introduced by *so* or *such*:

10. That I have something to do with this monstrousness! (Miller 1965:66)

11. That she could be so ruthless! (Beijer 2003:10)

In example (10) the speaker considers the very fact that someone believes that he has something to do with something described as *a monstrousness* to be remarkable. In example (11) the existence of the fact that she could be so *ruthless* is in itself a deviation from a norm.

Exclamatives, thus, do not only express deviations from certain norms, but also various, such as astonishment, joy, surprise and disappointment in relation to this deviation. These feelings regarding the propositional content of an utterance are conveyed via certain intonation patterns. The importance of intonation in relation to the correct interpretation of exclamations has already been mentioned many times in this paper. The question is now exactly in which ways intonation contour is involved.

Bolinger (1989:248) discusses this matter thoroughly. He agrees with Quirk et al.(1972,1985) in saying that exclamations are primarily used to express the speaker's own feelings, and he argues that this means that if intonation is basically affective, the connection between intonation and exclamation must be "board and deep"

Bolinger (1989) stresses that part of the problem concerning intonation and an exclamation is related to the fact that there is a great deal of variation concerning intonations that can be used in exclamations. There is no such thing as an " intonation of exclamation " according to Bolinger (1989:248), not even in the more general sense in talking about the intonation of questions and the intonation of commands, where certain contours do predominate.

What characteristics the intonation of exclamation is instead, according to Bolinger (1989:248) that it "reaches for the extreme". In default case, an exclamation is spoken with an extremely high pitch, but the pitch may also may be lower than usual, as long as it is extreme. Related to the fact that the intonation contour may be either extremely varied, or extremely monotone. The important thing here is that exclamations are, in some way or another, expected to show the voice in some manner "out of control". This "out of control" feature is naturally related to the fact exclamations are directly emotionally triggered.

According to Bolinger (1989) *WH*-exclamations, i.e., exclamations with initial *wh*-elements, almost universally have an intonation contour in which the degree-has the (exclamatory) accent and much higher pitch than the rest of the utterance. In that way it is indicated the degree-word is the most important word in the proposition.

Bolinger (1989) also discusses exclamative *yes/no*-interrogative, saying that they are fully interrogative in syntax (form), but highly frequent as exclamations (function). Concerning this type of exclamative, he states that "a conductive question interpreted as an exclamation is a rhetorical question (*won't we have the best time ever!* = *We'll have the best time ever!*), and should not sound too much as if it were being asked for information" (Bolinger 1989:275), i.e. an interrogative used as an exclamative should not have the usual question intonation contour.

In conclusion, there does not seem to exist an expressive/emotional or exclamative intonation contour in English. Instead there are more or less typical contours associated to each of the exclamative types. What these exclamative intonation contours have in common is that they tend to reach for the extreme, i.e. there are extremely big differences in pitch between different syllables in a typical exclamative utterance, and the pitch is usually extraordinarily high. An exclamative is supposed to show the voice in some sense.

In Rosengren (1997) there is an explanation of the relation between the sentence type/mood, the propositional content and the stress pattern. Explaining this, she follows Bierwisch (1988) and Fries (1991, 1994) introducing a conceptual system and an emotive system outside grammar, which the exclamatives makes reference to when uttered. These two systems differ in the way they are linked to reality.

Beijer (2003:11) states that the conceptual system contains our knowledge of the world, and the reference of a clause to this system is determined by the sentence mood and the propositional content. The emotive system consists of the emotions that are our emotive evaluation of objects and states of affairs in the actual world.

6- Exclamatives in the selected material:

In this section the paper will discuss the various kinds of exclamatives found in the selected corpus following Beijer's model of categorization which is the following: prototypical exclamatives, exclamatives with interrogative form, *such* (*a*) and *so* exclamative and exclamative that-clause and *to*-infinitive clauses.

6.1- Prototypical exclamatives:

All expressive/emotional utterances in the material introduced by *what* (*a*) or *how* are clearly exclamatives according to Rosegren's (1997) definition adopted here. The utterances as such are all scalar; they all refer to phenomena on high positions on various scales. They also express deviations from norm, not explicitly, but through a generalized implicature triggered by emphatic stress, though the paper used the written material, Beijer (2003:12) asserts that the presence of the exclamation mark can be considered as an indication of the emphatic stress. As pointed above, there is no intonation of exclamatives, but the intonation contours tend to reach for the extreme (Bolinger, 1989). Examples include (12-14)

12. What a fool I was not to think of it before! (Shaw1941:138)

13. What stupendous good fortune! (Christie 1954:13)

14. What tempers you men do have! (Osbourne 1965:50)

6.2- Exclamatives with interrogative form:

Another type of exclamative that has been recognized in the material is the interrogatively formed (verb first)-exclamative. There are only two instances of exclamatives in interrogative form in the material, which indicates that these exclamative types are not common in the drama written dialogue. It has been noted by Quirk et al. , 1985:11.22 , Rosengren, 1997:156 and Beijer,2003:12) that the negation has to be clitic (*n't*) in exclamatives. It is doubtful whether or not (and how) the negation actually changes the meaning and function of the utterances. Quirk et al., (1985) proposes, however, that there is a slight difference between (16) and (17):

15. Has *she* grown! (Quirk et al. , 1985:11.22)

16. Hasn't she *grown*! (ibid)

The difference is that the negative interrogative in (15) has a feature that is an appeal for the listener's confirmation, while the positive interrogative in (16) implies that the listener is no position to disagree (example 16) is thus more of a true question than example (15) is. This may be correct as Beijer (2003:13) states, which in that case indicates that the negation is not entirely pleonastic. The crucial part of the definition of an exclamative above was that it expresses a deviation from the norm. The expressive/emotional utterances belonging to this category definitely do so, which means that exclamatives with interrogative form exclamatives according to the definition.

6.3- Such (a) and so-exclamatives:

A function similar to that fulfilled by *what a* in prototypical can be fulfilled by *such a*, and almost the same function as that fulfilled by *how* in a prototypical exclamation may be filled by *so*:

17. You're such a boy!(Miller 1995:59) [cf. What a boy you are!]

18. We drank so much in tea in those days!(Pinter,1993:16) [cf. How much tea we drank in those days!]

The constructions with *so* and *such* are pragmatically similar to the constructions with *what* and *how*. The words *so* and *such* in themselves indicate extreme positions on scales, and the utterances are to be regarded as exclamatives. The constructions with *such* and *so* are obviously declarative sentences.

6.4- Exclamative *that*-clauses and *to*-infinitive clauses:

Quirk et al. (1985: 11.41), Rosengren (1997), and Beijer (2003) mention that *that*-clauses and *to*- infinitive clauses are used expressively/emotionally. According to Rosengren (1997:176) and Beijer (2003:13) *that*-clauses and *to*-infinitive clauses are declarative clauses that are used as exclamative through uttering them with intonation contour reaching for the extreme.

7- Other expressive/emotional utterances:

However, in the material other expressive/emotional utterances which Beijer(2003:14) calls *emotives* and these emotives have categorized them on functional or pragmatic grounds.

7.1- Strengthening emotive:

There are some instances in the material of speakers who strengthen what they have just said by use of expressive/emotional utterances:

19. I begged him to go. I ordered him to go!(Miller 1995:90)

20. It's not true-It's not true! (Christie 1954:38)

21. It matters very much to me. Very much to me!(Miller 1965:66)

The word *order* in (19) is obviously a semantically stronger word than *beg*, in terms of wanting somebody to do something, i.e. performing a kind of *directive* in Searle's terminology, or a kind *regulation* in the modified model. The two sentences in example (19) are assertions about illocutions, which makes this example different from (20) and (21). The exclamation mark in (19) indicates that the second part of the example has a higher pitch or emphatic stress. The emphatic stress is used to emphasize the speaker's change from *beg* to *order*, i.e. from a soft directive to a hard one.

The second part of the example in (20) strengthens what has just been said, but in another way than in example (19), because it is not an assertion about an illocution, and because the same words are repeated. The intonation pattern of the first instance of *it's not true* is likely to be neutral, while both the negation *not* and the adjective *true* are likely to be intonationally marked

in the second example. First the speaker mainly asserts that it is not true, but then he strengthens the assertion, as if he expects the interlocutors to doubt him. Example (21) could be analyzed in a similar way.

However, Beijer (2003:15) asserts that the strengthening utterances are not exclamative. They differ from exclamatives in several ways. When uttering an exclamative, the speaker expresses his feelings towards a state of affairs, which considers to be a deviation from a certain norm (by the use of a scalar word which denotes an extreme position on a scale), without explicitly stating his feelings. This is not the case here. The speakers in examples (20) and (21) merely strengthens the assertions they have just made, and the speaker in example (19) changes his mind concerning the right performative verb with which to refer to a specific speech act.

The speakers in examples (20) and (21) are obviously emotionally involved, since they feel a need to strengthen what they have just said, as if it were not strong enough. Thus, the utterances in (20) and (21) are emotive, but they do not qualify as *exclamative*, since they do not include scalar features as Rosengren (1997) and Beijer (2003) assert.

7.2- Emotives with remarkable semantic contents:

Another kind of expressive/emotional utterance that could be argued to qualify as exclamatives are expressive/emotional utterances in which the semantic content is remarkable in various ways. However, they do not qualify as exclamatives, since in these cases, the speakers merely assert propositions with marked semantic content. The assertions do not cease to be assertions, just because the speaker finds their semantic to be remarkable and thus uses intonation contours that are different from contours usually found in assertions. Some examples:

22. He flunked the subject, and lay down and died like a hummer hit him! (Miller, 1995:91)

23. But the whole thing's crazy (Christie 1954:47)

24. I sometimes think I'm married to a raving lunatic!(Pinter 1993:19)

8-Exclamatives, emotives, and speech acts:

In terms of speech acts theory, *exclamatives* and *emotives* are, by virtue of their expressive/ emotional nature, related to Searle's *expressive* and *emotives* do not however, propositionalize the emotions involved in the way the paradigm expressives(thanking, apologizing, etc.) do.

However, Vanderveken (1994) discusses the five primitive illocutionary forces, which according to him are the simplest possible forces; all other illocutionary forces being more complex.

These five forces correspond to the five basic speech acts in Searle's system. (Assertions, commissives, directives, declarations, and expressives),

and, according to Vanderveken (1994), one of the five primitive forces is *the primitive expressive illocutionary force*, which is realized by exclamatory sentences. According to him exclamatory utterances/sentences are thus used to realize the primitive expressive illocutionary force.

However, Beijer (2003:18) states that it is not clear how Vanderveken (1994) deals with the fact that exclamatory utterances do not propositionalize (explicitly express) their emotive content. Perhaps he does not think this is a crucial criterion for expressives. It would seem that Vanderveken suggests that all utterances that Beijer (2003) has called emotives are expressive in terms of speech acts. To him, it seems obvious that exclamatives and emotives in addition to being expressive/emotional also assert propositions, while Searle's expressives propositionalize their emotive content. Sadock & Zwicky (1985) seem to agree with Beijer (2003) when they say that "the function of exclamatory sentences is much like of declarative sentences, except that exclamations are intended to be expressive whereas declaratives are intended to be informative. Both represent a proposition as being true, but in an exclamation, the speaker emphasizes his intellectual appraisal that the proposition is true." (Sadock & Zwicky 1985:162). Consider the following examples:

25. How lonely he was till he could come home to you! (Miller, 1995:61)

26. Vienna is so dull! (Osbourne 1965:76)

27. You're a pair of animals! (Miller, 1995:118)

28. I never did like that man! (Christie, 1954:29)

29. It's contacts, Charley, I got important contacts! (Miller, 1995:55)

The expressive/ emotional utterances are all assertive and emotional/ expressive. Syntactically, they are declarative sentences, which mean that their default mapping is onto assertions. It is thus not surprising that they are assertive. What is more surprising is the fact that they are simultaneously expressive (Beijer, 2003:18). It seems as if the best way to explain the nature of *emotives* and *exclamatives* is to say that they are declarative and interrogative sentences with specific intonation contours that in terms of speech acts are hybrids between assertions and expressives. Rosengren (1997:179) is thus correct in stating that "exclamations seem to be a kind of illocutionary act of their own" and that "exclamations, then, are some kind of illocution not fitting into the standard system defined by Searle".

9- Conclusions:

The paper has separated exclamatives from other expressive/emotional utterances in general, and shown how exclamatives and other expressive/emotional utterances may be analyzed in terms of sentence types and speech acts types. The paper has adopted the idea suggested by

10-References:

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