Locutionary, Illocutionary and Perlocutionary Acts

Between Modern linguistics and Traditional Arabic Linguistics

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ABSTRACT

The present paper is part of a larger project to investigate the hypothesis that traditional Arab linguists were well acquainted with some of the main ideas and concepts of modern pragmatics. In this paper the researcher tries to find out whether Arab linguists were familiar with one of the major tenets of speech–act theory, namely, the analysis of a speech act (SA) into locutionary, illocutionary and perlocutionary acts, which J.L. Austin used in his analysis of speech acts. It is a commonplace assumption in the history of modern linguistics that speech-act theory and its key features were first proposed by Austin in the middle of the 20th century.

The aim of this paper is to question that assumption; therefore, the problem or the question that the researcher undertakes to answer is whether Arab linguists of the past knew speech acts and were able to analyse them before modern linguists and philosophers like Austin, and consequently to see whether these aspects of the theory have a longer history than is assumed in the literature.

The first part of the paper gives a survey of the above concepts as they appear in modern linguistic literature in the west. The second part deals with the Arabs' contribution to the same concepts and aspects of the theory in an attempt to show their familiarity with them centuries before modern linguists.

The method the researcher uses to achieve his aim is quoting from traditional books of Arab and Muslim linguists (rhetoricians and jurisprudents). Using samples of such quotations with special reference to directives, the researcher finds adequate evidence to support his hypothesis that Arab and Muslim linguists were familiar with the above concepts and analyses. The only difference is terminological and does not affect the findings in any significant way.

The present paper is only a first step: It is recommended that future research should be carried out along the same lines to answer similar questions with even more adequate evidence.

The quotations are in translation (in English), and you will find the original Arabic texts in the appendix. The translations into English are my own.
PART I
Some Key Concepts of Modern Speech-Act Theory

Austin's Discovery of Performatives

J.L. Austin discovered a group of sentences, which he labeled "performative utterances" or "performatives", in which the uttering of the words constitutes the performing of an action. He pointed out that the function of language is not limited to informing or describing states of affairs as in constative utterances or "constatives": language is a mode of action, too. We can use language to perform various sorts of acts, e.g. to marry, to divorce, to declare war, to bet, to thank, to apologize, etc. Austin (1962:5) gives us some examples of performative utterances:

1- I bet you sixpence it will rain tomorrow.
   I bequeath my watch to my brother.
   I name this ship the Queen Elizabeth.
   I do. (take this woman to be my lawful wedded wife).

He, then, attempts to characterize the linguistic form of the conventional and ritualistic performatives in (1) above. He says that "all will have, as it happens, humdrum verbs in the first person singular present indicative active". Levinson (1983:244) summarizes this linguistic form thus:
I hereby VP you (that).....

where VP is a performative verb drawn from a limited and determinate set of verbs in the language in question. This raises the issue of the acid test of a performative. According to Austin (1962:57), performatives, unlike constatives, cannot be evaluated in terms of truth and falsity. He also points out that "(hereby) is a useful criterion that the utterance is performative". The possibility of inserting "hereby" indicates that the sentence is a performative. This is why (3a) below is a performative whereas (3b) is not: (The asterisk at the beginning of examples indicates that they are not possible)

3-a. I hereby sentence you to four years' imprisonment.

*3-b. I hereby frighten you.

Felicity conditions

But Austin declares that although, unlike constatives, performatives cannot be assessed as true or false, they can go wrong (or be unhappy, or infelicitous, in his terms) in various ways. Imagine yourself saying to the first person you come across in the street “I sentence you to ten years’ imprisonment”. In that case the action you attempt to perform is null and void, because there are certain institutional conditions that should be met before the successful performance of such an action. To mention but one, you should be the right person i.e. authorized or entitled to pass such a sentence. On the basis of such cases, Austin suggested three categories of conditions which must be satisfied for a performative act to be felicitous, and he termed them Felicity Conditions (FCs):
4-A. (1) There must be a conventional procedure having a conventional effect.

(2) The circumstances and persons must be appropriate, as specified in the procedure

B. The procedure must be executed (1) correctly and (2) completely

C. Often (1) the persons must have the requisite thoughts, feeling and intentions, as specified in the procedure and (2) if consequent conduct is specified, then the relevant parties must so do.

Austin (1962) goes on to point out that these felicity conditions are not of equal stature, nor are their violations. The violations of A and B conditions result in what he calls *misfires*, when the intended action is not performed, whereas violations of C conditions are only *abuses*, when the action is performed but infelicitously or insincerely. Some of these conditions are verbal: they have to do with the uttering of certain conventional words; others are non-verbal: they have to do with the conventional procedure and the appropriate participants etc.

Austin (1962) found out that the performative category covers a wider range of utterances, subsuming some which are not of the highly conventionalized or ritualistic type, but are used in ordinary language situations. Thus the uttering of the sentences: (5- a, b) could also constitute the performing of the acts that are depicted by their performative verbs, i.e. promising and warning.

5- (a) I promise that I shall be there.

(b) I warn you that there is a bull in the field.

He, then, drew a parallel distinction between explicit performatives which satisfy the linguistic form in (2) above or one of its varieties, and implicit performatives which do not conform to that form although it is assumed and implicit. Thus (6a) and (6b) assume (5a) and (5b) respectively:

The explicit performatives which Austin isolated in the beginning were of the type that Searle (1976) later termed "Declarations", and Bach & Harnish (B&H) (1979) termed "conventional illocutionary acts" distinguishing them from 'communicative illocutionary acts'.

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6- (a) I shall be there.
(b) There is a bull in the field.

But this generally applies to the three sentence-types which are common almost in every language, namely the imperative, the interrogative and the declarative. So, we can assume that the imperative contains the performative verb (*I order you to*..), and the interrogative contains (*I ask you whether*..), and the declarative contains (*I state to you that*..). Consequently, they are implicit performatives. But, then, this means that even constatives are performatives: to say "I state to you that..." is also to perform an act: that of stating.

**Locutionary, Illocutionary and Perlocutionary Acts**

Before setting out to make a list of performative verbs, it seemed to Austin more expedient to go back and make a fresh start on the problem. Thus, he reconsidered the senses in which "to say something may be to do something", and suggested that a speaker can simultaneously perform three acts in issuing an utterance: the **locutionary** act is the act of saying something with a certain sense and reference; the **illocutionary** act is the act performed in saying something, i.e. the act named and identified by the explicit performative verb. The **perlocutionary** act is the act performed by, or as a consequence of, saying something. Austin (1962:101) gave the following examples:

Act (A) or Locution

He said to me ‘Shoot her!’ meaning by 'shoot' shoot and referring by ‘her ’ to her
Act (B) or Illocution

He urged (or advised, ordered, & c.) me to shoot her.

Act (C. a) or perlocution

He persuaded me to shoot her.

Act (C. b)

He got me to (or made me, & c) shoot her.

All three acts are usually performed at the same time, and Austin distinguished them for the sake of analysis. Within the locutionary act Austin distinguishes three subsidiary acts: a phonetic act of producing certain noises; a phatic act of uttering certain words belonging to a certain vocabulary, in a certain grammar with a certain intonation, etc.; and a rhetic act of using the sentence with a definite sense and reference (which together are equivalent to meaning).

Austin (1962:95) elaborates on the three types of acts:

(1) Obviously, to perform a phatic act I must perform a phonetic act, or, if you like, in performing one I am performing the other... : but the converse is not true, for if a monkey makes a noise indistinguishable from "go" it is still not a phatic act.

(2) Obviously in the definition of the phatic act two things were lumped together: vocabulary and grammar. So, we have not assigned a special name to the person who utters, for example, "cat thoroughly the if" or "the slithy toves did gyre". Yet a further point arising is the intonation as well as grammar and vocabulary.

(3) The phatic act, however, like the phonetic, is essentially mimicable, reproducible (including intonation, winks, gestures, &c.). One can mimic not merely the statement in quotation marks "She has lovely hair", but also the more complex fact that he said it like this: "She has lovely hair" (shrugs)

It is the illocutionary act that is the focus of Austin's attention. It is the essence of the speech act, and the two terms are often used interchangeably. The locutionary/illocutionary distinction is not very difficult: the locutionary act refers to the sense of what is said, whereas the illocutionary act refers to its
force: how what was said was meant, i.e whether the illocutionary force of the locutionary act was an order, a request, a piece of advice, a threat etc.

The perlocutionary / illocutionary distinction, however, is a bit more difficult. We can say of the utterance of "shoot her" above that it had the illocutionary act of ordering, requesting, advising the addressee to shoot her; and that it had the perlocutionary effect of, for example, forcing or persuading the addressee to shoot her. Briefly, an illocutionary act is a conventional linguistic act, whereas a perlocutionary act is a non–conventional non-linguistic one. The first is under the control of the speaker, while the second is not. That is why Austin distinguishes between perlocutionary object, i.e. the intended result of the act, and perlocutionary sequel, i.e. the unintended result.

The perlocutionary / illocutionary distinction has been illustrated by contrasting lists of perlocutionary and illocutionary verbs. Thus, to persuade, frighten, get h (hearer) to do... etc. are perlocutionary, not illocutionary, acts because they cannot figure in explicit performatives, or they cannot be used performatively:

*7- I (hereby) persuade you.
*8- I (hereby) frighten you.
*9- I (hereby) get you to do.

Towards the end of his book, Austin attempts a classification of illocutionary verbs using the explicit performative test and a concise dictionary. He comes up with five main classes or categories: (Verdictives, excercitives, commissives, behabitives, expositives)
Since then, many alternative taxonomies have been suggested and many reformulations and systematizations attempted. The most influential was Searle's.

Searle’s Development of the Theory

Austin's early death left many gaps and unanswered questions about the theory. John Searle (1969) undertook to develop the theory to render it more systematic. He chooses to drop the separation of an utterance into locutionary and illocutionary acts and adopt a distinction between a proposition or propositional act and illocutionary force indicating devices (IFID), which mark the illocutionary force. These include the mood of the verb or the main sentence-types, intonation contours, explicit performatives ...etc. Searle (1965:42) suggests that all five utterances in (10) express the same proposition: i.e. predicating the act of leaving the room of John:

10- (a) Will John leave the room?
    (b) John will leave the room.
    (c) John leave the room!
    (d) Would that John left the room.
    (e) If John will leave the room, I will leave also.

though each of them can characteristically be used to perform a different illocutionary act. The first would, characteristically, be a question, the second

\[\text{This is shorthand for saying that utterances are used by speakers to express propositions}\]
an assertion, the third a request or order, the fourth an expression of a wish, and the fifth a hypothetical expression of intention.

A proposition is distinct from an assertion or the statement of that proposition. The proposition that John will leave the room is expressed in the utterance of all the sentences in (10), but only in the second one is that proposition asserted. Searle (1969:30) summarizes his idea: "I am distinguishing between the illocutionary act and the propositional content of an illocutionary act". This distinction, Searle admits, is a variation of an old distinction which has been marked by philosophers such as Frege, Schiffer, Lewis, Reichenbach and Hare, among others. However, he blames most philosophers for speaking "as though predications only occurred in assertions, and hence no predication would occur in the utterance of [10.a, c, d,]."

He goes on to say (Searle, 1969:26):

This seems to me not merely an inconvenient terminology-failing to allow us to mark the use of inflections of a common predicate expression in different kinds of illocutionary acts- but it also shows a profound miscomprehension of the similarity between assertions and other illocutionary acts, and the distinction of illocutionary acts from propositions.

Searle points out that the distinction between IFIDs and propositions is very important because it enables us to separate our analysis of propositions from our analysis of illocutionary acts. He suggests representing this distinction symbolically as: $F(p)$, or more specifically, $F(RP)$, where the variable " $F$ " takes IFIDs as values, and small " $p$ " takes expressions for propositions, " $R$ " stands for the referring expression and capital " $P$ " for the predicating expression.

According to Searle (1969), this enables us to make the often overlooked distinction between illocutionary negation $\sim F(P)$: " I do not promise to come " and the propositional negation $F(\sim P)$: " I promise not to come ".


PART II

Analysing a Speech Act into its Constituents In Traditional Arabic Linguistics

A / In the Works of Usūlies (Jurisprudents)

We saw above how Austin ended with the claim that, generally speaking, all utterances are performatives, i.e. are also doing things, and this led him to consider the senses in which "to say something may be to do something": the locutionary, illocutionary and perlocutionary acts which are performed simultaneously.

In the area of these different components of SAs, the contributions of Arab linguists (jurisprudents and rhetoricians) were considerable. But, for lack of space, we have to be selective and brief.

We start with the Usūlies (jurisprudents). These were pragmaticists par excellence because they were motivated by the practical need to derive Islamic law (legal rules) from the Holy Quran and the Mohammedan tradition, a task which involves interpretation and setting rules that guide it. Obviously this also involves the context and the intentions of the speaker.

As far as SAs are concerned, the most important category for the Usūlies was directives because most legislations were usually either orders or prohibitions. Usūlies concentrated exclusively on directives; however their analyses and terminology can be extended to other SA categories in the same way as Searle's (1965:40) concentration on the SA of promising can "provide us with a pattern for analysing other kinds of acts and consequently for explicating the notion in general".
Directives: A Sample of SA Analysis

In (Al-Mustasfa), Al-Ghazzali (d.505H., 1904 vol.1) provides us with a detailed account of the analysis of 'amr' (order or command) into its constituents. Like other Usulies he addresses the question: what makes 'amr' what it is? As we shall see, in answer to this question, each of the different parties of Usulies emphasized one aspect or constituent of SAs. Thus, some (e.g. Al-Balakhi) said that what makes an order what it is, is its linguistic form; others (e.g. Ibn Al-Jubai) said it is its intended effect (or perlocutionary effect in Austin's terms); yet others argued that it is the equivalent of the illocutionary intention that makes it what it is. However, most Mutazilite scholars argued that all the three intentions or acts are necessary for command to take place.

He starts his account by addressing the questions of whether the term 'amr' refers to the psychological internal act or the linguistic act; whether it is used literally to refer to the first, and is used only nonliterally to refer to the other, or whether it is an ambiguous term. For lack of space, we skip this philosophical issue and its ramifications although it relates to the different senses in which a SA is a SA.

Then, Al-Ghazzali (d.505H, 1904) (drawing on Al-Juwaini in his Burhan) surveys the different approaches to the analysis and definition of 'amr'. He gives an account of three approaches attributed to three parties, some of whom "Mutazilites" others "Asharites". The second Mutazilite party subdivides into three parties, the third of which offers the more

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When referring to Arab scholars' works I will use the usual modern method of referencing but add the year of death of the scholar at the beginning of the reference. The Mutazilites and Asharites are two rival theological sects in Islamic thought; the first gives more weight to reason and rationalism; whereas the second represents the more scholastic and orthodox trend.
comprehensive and systematic approach and the closest to Austin's analysis of a SA into its components.

Since this third party is more comprehensive and subsumes the others, it will suffice by itself as a sample of the kind of analysis we want to exemplify. Al-Ghazzli (d.505H, 1904:414) in his says:

The third party of Mutazilite scholars say: it [amr or command] does not become what it is due to its form or mood, nor due to its decontextualized form; rather it becomes 'amr' due to three kinds of intending:

1. intending to produce the linguistic form (utterance)
2. Intending to mean by that form a command and not, for instance, a permission or a threat. 3. intending that the command be carried out or obeyed. Some argued that one intention is sufficient, viz., intending the command to be carried out. But this is untenable for a variety of reasons:.....

(my emphasis and numbering)

Al-Ghazzali, then, goes on to give counter examples to undermine the Mutazilite definition of 'amr' and its conditions. But although the above text is apparently an attempt at defining 'amr' and its felicity conditions, an important outcome or byproduct of this attempt is a description of the three aspects of 'amr', which is generalizable to all other SAs. It is not difficult to see the close resemblance between 1,2 and 3 in the above text and Austin's locutionary, illocutionary and perlocutionary acts respectively. The only difference is that the third is not perlocutionary in the real sense

According to Attar in his commentary on (Jami Jawami,vol.1,p.476) these Mutazilite scholars were Abu-Ali Jubbai (303,AH) and his son Abu-Hashim Jubai (321,AH): "In addition to the higher status of the speaker, Abu-Ali and his son Abu-Hashim consider the intention to mean a command by the form, otherwise it would not be a command because the form is used for meanings other than command such as threatening , and the only criterion is intention".

(No.1)
of effect or sequel but it is rather the sincerity condition. But that is not a problem; we remember that SA theorists (e.g. B&H, 1979:16) do not consider perlocutionary effect as part of SA proper: it is "external to language"; and well before B&H, Ibn-Hisham (d.761H,1965:31) in a passage from (Shuthoor A-Thahab) acknowledged that "the significance or meaning of ((stand up!)) is achieved simultaneously with its utterance and is not subsequent to it. What in fact is subsequent to it is the "imtithal" (compliance or obedience) and this is external to the significatum of the utterance". Al-Suyuti (d.911H,1973:76) did the same thing in his (Itqan).

Al-Ghazzali and other Usūlies (e.g. Amidi and Igi ) did not neglect the debate between the Mutazilites and Asharites over the other rules and FCs of command or 'amr' such as the preparatory condition of the status of the speaker. But how come that they deal with the constituents of a SA together with its FCs ? The constituents are obviously related to FCs: the propositional content condition is closely related to the locutionary act; the sincerity condition is somehow related to the perlocutionary act.

Al-Ghazzali and Amidi, being Asharite, criticized the Mutazilite taxonomy of SA constituents and felicity conditions, but they did not do them justice in that criticism. All they tried to prove was that the FCs proposed by the Mutazilite were not singly sufficient for an utterance to be a command (in the case of amr).

It is true that some parties of Mutazilites did argue for the sufficiency of one condition or another. However, this was none of the claims of the third party: they argued that the three conditions were only jointly sufficient. But they would have been better off if they had distinguished between what B&H (1979:55) call success conditions and felicity conditions: the first are singly necessary and jointly sufficient for the performance of a SA, whereas the second are required for non-defectiveness. Sincerity conditions are of the second type.

It is interesting to notice that Attar (d.1250H,1244H:466) in his Gloss on Jami Jawami points out that (Fanari) in his (Fusul Badai ) argued that 'a
combination of the three kinds of intending is necessary for the performance of a command'. This supports my view. Another support comes from the Mutazilite Al-Qadhi Abdul-Jabbar (d.415H,1960,vol.15:223) in his (Mughni), where he analyses the constituents and conditions of the SA of assertion or statement

.. know that in order to be an assertion, it does not suffice for an utterance to have the linguistic form or mood or a previous convention; the speaker has to be intending to use it to inform or assert what it is used to assert, since all the above [conditions] may obtain without it being an assertion if he[the speaker] does not intend what we have mentioned.

But as soon as they obtain intentionally, it becomes an assertion...

(text No.2)

The Mutazilites gave great weight to intention and the status of the speaker in their theory of communication; without these, they argued, there would be no communication. Qadhi Abdul-Jabbar (d.415H,1960,vol.16:347) points out:

.. The reason why the status of the speaker has to be taken into consideration is that if he utters something without knowing the conventional meaning, or if he knows it but utters it by way of reciting or reporting or as a mouthpiece or unintentionally, then it will not be meaningful. But if he utters it intending its conventional meaning, then it must be meaningful if it is known from his status that it communicates his intentions... Thus if all these conditions are met, then it must be meaningful; and whenever they are not all met, then it will have the potential
to mean, even though it would not be good evidence if it was uttered by someone whose status is not so.

(overall text No.3)

He further (p.7) points out that speech is the sounds and letters of language, but it is not conventionally described as such "unless it is produced by someone who communicates or is capable of communication; therefore birds' sounds are not speech, even though they might contain a structure of one or two sounds or letters".

In a similar vein, Abdul -Qahir Al- Jurjani (d.471H,1961:1314) in his Dalail Ijaz deals in part with what Austin calls the " phatic act". He stresses the importance of syntactic structure. Thus, he argues, if you take a line of verse and jumble it or if you start a sentence with a subject and stop without completing it, then your act will be equal to a noise you make.

These two arguments partially relate to Austin's phatic act. Jurjani gives similar examples to Austin's (1962:96) "cat thoroughly the if" and "the slithy toves did gyre" ; Abdul-Jabbar's example of the sounds of birds is echoed in Austin's claim that "if a monkey makes a noise indistinguishable from ((go)) it is still not a phatic act", or even in Searle's (1965:40)

It is a logical presupposition, for example, of current attempts to decipher the Mayan hieroglyphs that we at least hypothesize that the marks we see on the stones were produced by beings more or less like ourselves and produced with certain kinds of intentions. If we were certain that the marks were a consequence of, say, water erosion, then the question of deciphering them or even calling them hieroglyphs could not arise.
Now we can summarize the technical terminology used by Austin, Ibn Hisham and the Mutazilite in the following table.

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It is interesting to notice that the locutionary act is not analysed into its minute constituents of phonetic, phatic and rhetic acts. But we shall notice shortly that Arab rhetoricians did deal with such details in their analysis.

To sum up this section we say that Usulies knew three SA constituents parallel to Austin's but they dealt with them and the FCs at the same time; however, that is not a serious problem because these two notions are in fact interrelated.

B / In the Works of Balaghiyin (Rhetoricians)

2.5.1 Another Approach : First Meanings and Second Meanings:

The Usūlies approach to language was closely tied to Islamic theology and law. They stressed the pragmatic aspects of language as a means of communication. Their main task was to derive laws from the Holy Quran and the Tradition of the prophet and their work was governed by this practical motive.

Rhetoricians, on the other hand, were aesthetically motivated. Their aim was to prove the inimitability of the language of the Quran. But most rhetoricians were influenced by the Usulies and as they were dealing with such aesthetic questions as whether the source of eloquence was the
meaning (ma’anī) meaning or the al-faṣṣal (alfaz) words, they were able to devise a terminology for describing and analyzing language and SA constituents.

Paradoxically, Al-Jurjani, who was the father of Arabic rhetoric and the source of many important distinctions, did not deal with SAs. His concepts and terms do not fit the analysis of SAs very well, but his commentators developed his ideas and terminologies and carried them a step further.

In addressing the question concerning the source of eloquence and whether it is to be ascribed to meaning or to form they distinguish three aspects or constituents of the linguistic act: (1) the al-faṣṣal (the words) 'Mana awwal' (the first meaning) (2) 'mana thani' (the second meaning). As we shall see, (1) and (2) are equivalent to Austin's locutionary act, while (3) equals the illocutionary act. The perlocutionary effect does not seem to have a place in this analysis.

Jurjani’s commentators and followers (e.g. Shuruh Talkhis, Taftazani’s Mutawwal and Abdul-Hakim’s Tajrid and many others) tried to solve the problem posed by the fact that Jurjani sometimes seemed to claim that the source of eloquence was the words and sometimes that it was the meanings.

Taftazani (d. 793H, 1912: 19) argues that we have three constituents not two and that the source of eloquence is the second one 'Mana awwal' the first meaning or خصوصيات 'Khususyat', by which Jurjani meant the syntactic constructions or stylistic devices which are the words put in a certain form to express the second meaning 'Mana thani' which constitutes the third component, namely, the illocutionary forces and intentions which the speaker wants to perform such as praising, despising or denying etc.

Now, according to his commentators (e.g. Taftazani, Anbabi), when Al-Jurjani attributes eloquence to words or to meaning he does not mean words as single groups of sounds nor meanings as mere intentions entertained by the speaker because both these things are there for anybody
to use or entertain; the source of eloquence is the words when they are put into a certain syntactic or stylistic constructions to convey the meanings or intentions of the speaker. He dubs this second constituent "Mana awwal" or "Khususyat"

The interesting thing is that whatever Al-Jurjani meant in his account about the source of eloquence, the terminology adopted by his commentators was never used by Jurjani himself. He did not use 'Mana thani' to mean the illocutionary force or the intention the speaker wants to express in uttering a sentence.

However, that is not a very serious problem; we can ascribe these ideas to his commentators. But again for lack of space, we have to be selective in our quotations. Taftazani (d.793H,1912:29) points out:

....Thus, there are words, first meanings and second meanings...
and Sheik[Jurjani] definitely argues that eloquence is attributed to them[first meanings]; and what merits to be described as eloquent and the like lie in them not in the uttered words, which are sounds and letters, nor in the second meanings, which are the intentions or forces that the speaker wants to confirm or deny....

(text No.4)

Abdul-Hakim distinguishes between the use of these terms in two subsidiary disciplines of 'balagha', namely 'Ilm-ma'ani' (literally, science of meanings) and 'Ilm-Bayan' (literally science of eloquence). Dusuqi (d.1230H,1342vol.1:135) in refers to Abdul-Hakim's account:

...and what Abdul-Hakim and some commentators of
mutawwal say is that the **first meaning is that which is understood from words through structures, which is the literal or conventional meaning plus the "Khususyat"** such as definite / indefinite use, fronting or thematization and ellipsis or anaphors. **The second meaning is the forces or intentions which the speaker intends and which he issues his utterance in order to convey; and they are also the status of the addressee for which the speaker uses the "Kususyat' such as exaltation and contempt, the expression of love or boredom, denial and suspicion and what not.** This is "Ilm-maani"-wise. However, "Ilm-Bayan"-wise, the **first meanings** are the literal signification, taking the context into consideration; the **second meanings** are figurative meanings and euphemisms. Some [scholars] say that the "Alfaz" or words' indication of the first meaning could be either conventional or inferential; however their indication of the second meaning is definitely inferential. The reason is that "Alfaz" or words indicate or signify the implications and "Khususyat" which are the effects or results of the speaker's intentions, and effects indicate causes inferentially, even though conventionally. Thus it is the "Alfaz" or words that indicate or signify the second meaning but only via the mediation of the first meaning. This is what one understands from Jurjani's "Dalail Ijaz" and [Taftazani's] "Mutawal"....(my emphasis)

(text No.5)
Obviously, the above text invites comparison: Abdul-Hakim's characterization of the first meaning is very close to Austin's characterization of locutionary acts; and the second meaning in ilm-maani is equivalent to illocutionary acts. The only missing component in this analysis is the perlocutionary effect, which is not a very important concept because it is external to language.

These analyses were taken some steps further by Sakkaki (d.626H,1937) in his (Miftah), by commentators on "Talkhis", and even by Hazim Qirtajini (608-684 AH), who was a literary critic, in his (Minhaj Bulaga), but for lack of space we leave it at that.

**The Distinction Between a Proposition and an Assertion**

We have pointed out above that one of Searle's important ideas is the distinction between assertions and propositions. Thus, according to Searle the five sentences in (10) above express the same proposition, i.e., predicating the act of leaving the room of John, though each one of them can be used to perform a different illocutionary act and only the second one is an assertion.

Arab linguists distinguished three kinds of predications. Dusuqi (d.1230H,1342,vol.1:164-166) in his commentary on Taftazani says:

> Know that predications are of three kinds: 1. linguistic (or speech) predication 2. conceptual or psychological predication 3. external (referential) predication. The first one is the relation between the two sides (the subject and predicate) that is understood from the utterance. The second is conceptualizing and imagining that relation in the mind of the speaker. The third is the real relation in the external world.....Thus the first and third [predications] exist in one of the sides, and the second exists in the mind of the speaker.
Then Dusuqi goes on to explain the difference between predication in performatives and assertives:

What he means by relation here includes assertive predication, which asserts the predication between the subject and predicate, and the performative predication ... He does not mean the assertive predication exclusively, since in performative predication there is no assertion of the predication because the predication in "Zaid! Beat Amr" is attributing the act of beating to Zaid under the aspect of requesting him to do it, and the predication in "Did Zaid stand up?" is attributing the act of standing to Zaid under the aspect of asking whether he did it...

Performatives definitely have predications but their predications are not assertive...

Hence we know that speech predication, external predication and the correspondence and non-correspondence with the external world are all there in both assertives and performatives; the only difference between them is in the intention: in assertives it is necessary to intend what corresponds or does not correspond, whereas in performatives there is no such intention...(my emphasis)

The above quoted text anticipates Searle's claim that propositions are not restricted to assertions, and that almost every speech act has a proposition. Dusuqi is only a commentator and he is one of many. These are brief samples of the kind of awareness of the issues that Searle raised in his version of the theory.

Conclusion And Recommendation

Using samples of quotations from traditional books of Arab and Muslim linguists (rhetoricians and jurisprudents), adequate evidence has been found to support the hypothesis that Arab and Muslim linguists were familiar with the concepts and analyses of
modern speech act theorists such as locutionary, illocutionary and perlocutionary acts. We have given, as a sample, their analysis of directives. They were also familiar with Searle's distinction between the illocutionary act and the propositional content of an illocutionary act. The only difference is terminological and does not affect the findings in any significant way.

The present paper is only a first step: It is recommended that future research should be carried out along the same lines to answer similar questions with even more adequate evidence.

**Arabic References:**


Ibn-Hisham, Jamaluddin (1965) *Shuthoor Al-thahab*. Cairo: Dar Al-Fikr, Cairo.


Qadhi, Abduljabbar (1960) *Al-Mughni*. Cairo: MOC.


**Other references:**
APPENDIX

THE ORIGINAL ARABIC TEXTS QUOTED IN TRANSLATION

(text No.1)

[Arabic text]

(text No.2)

[Arabic text]

(text No.3)

[Arabic text]
(text No.4)
فهناك أفعال ومعانى أول ومعانى ثانى، يتجنب (الشريف) قطعًا بأن القصيدة من الأوصاف الراجعة إليها (المعنى الأول)، لأن قضية التي بها ينحث الكلام أنها يوصف بالقصيدة والبلاغة والانجاز وما شاكل ذلك إنما هو فيها لا في الأفعال الراجعة إلى القرآن في المواقف التي يرى
المتكلم إلينا أو تلقينا.

(text No.5)
والذي نكره عبد الحكيم ويجب بعض حالات المطلوب أن المعنى الأول هو ما يفهم من النظافة بحسب التركيب وهو أصل المعنى مع الشخصيات من تعريف وتكبير وتقدير
ولأخير وحذف وإضمار، والمعنى الثاني: الأفعال التي يقصدها المتكلم وصوغ الكلام لأجل إسنادها وهي أقوال المفاهيم التي يورد المتكلم الشخصيات لأجلها من إشارة ومعنا ومعاني وتعابير وصعبات وإكرار، وذلك في الم 있다는، هذا بالنسبة لقيم المعاني. أما بالنسبة لعلم العيني، فالمعنى الأول هو المثلثات المشابهة مع رفع من متضمن الحال، والمعنى الثانى هو المعنى المجاني أو الكاذبة، وكره أن نقل الأفعال على المعنى الأول ونقل الموضوع عليه، والناقد عليه المعنى
الثاني تقليدًا، وذلك لأن الكلام غالبًا مع المفاهيم والصياغات وهي آثار الأفعال والتأثر تدل على العناصر عقلية دولة وثقاف الحرب والتجارة. فالفاعل على المعنى الثاني هو الفعل الذي يتمبذر دالاً معنى الأول، وهذا هو المأخوذ من كلام الشريف في (いただける الإجازة) كما يضحى في (المعلوم).

(text No.6)
علم إن السبب ثلاثة: كلامية وذهنية وخارجة. فأولى تنفع احذة الأطراف المتغير من الكلام. وصيغة وحروفها في ذه المتكلم هو السبب للذهنية.
وتنفع احذة الأطراف بالخارج في الخارج خارجية... فأولى والثانية قائمة بحد الأطراف. والثالثة قائمة بذات المتكلم.

(text No.7)
في هذا أن السبب الكتابية الخارجة والصياغية ومثابتها أموت أورور من حق الإثبات، والذين بينهما إنما هو القصد، والذين لا يليه في منقحة المشابهة أو قصد عما، والإثبات ليس فيه قصد للمفاهيم ولا دعم...

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