A Critique of Hugh Grady’s Concepts of ‘Aesthetic’ and ‘Critical’ Paradigms
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1-Introduction
In his The Modernist Shakespeare: Critical Texts in a Material World, Hugh Grady applies Thomas S. Kuhn’s notion of scientific ‘paradigm shifts’ to the domain of literary studies, writing, thus, about ‘aesthetic’ and ‘critical’ paradigms. Quite aware of the too long tradition of criticism that revolves around the Shakespearean text, Grady states that his study will add very little about Shakespeare himself or the plays themselves. His project, rather, would be “to suspend momentarily that conversation and instead undertake a reflective discourse on the underlying assumptions which make such necessary and sometimes admirable talk possible and which shape and limit it in ways we are only now beginning to appreciate fully.”

This ‘reflective discourse’ can best be undertaken, Grady proceeds to argue, by appealing to Kuhn’s aforementioned concept of ‘paradigm shift’ first applied to ‘hard sciences’ in Kuhn’s The Structure of Scientific Revolutions (1962). Kuhn applied “the concept of the paradigm as an alternative to the prevailing notion of the history of science that change in scientific theory proceeded on the basis of a steady accretion of evidence which slowly confirmed or modified existing theory and produced gradual progress.”

Wedded to Grady’s formulation are other two attempts, so far as we are aware, that have traded on Kuhn’s concept of ‘paradigm shift’ in the field of literary studies to account for (in their view) the decline and emergence of literary movements and critical trends: Anthony Easthope’s Literary into Cultural Studies (1991) and F.C. Mcgrath’s The Sensible Spirit: Walter Pater and the Modernist Paradigm (1986).

In this study, it will be argued that the application of the concept of the paradigm to literary and critical movements is untenable, due to the sharp differences, acknowledged by scientists and critics alike, between science and literature. It will be shown, throughout the study, that the manipulations of the above mentioned theorists of this concept in literature are unjustifiably simplified, making a pre-theoretical and non-technical use of the concept of the paradigm. Besides, it will be shown that their manipulation is fraught with lacuna and self-contradictions. However, since it is Grady who, more than the other two scholars, pushed this application to considerable extremes, the discussion will mainly be of his version of the concepts of ‘aesthetic’ and ‘critical’ paradigms. But references will be made to Easthope and Mcgrath, when need be. And it will be presupposed that Grady’s ‘aesthetic’ and ‘critical’ paradigms are, unless otherwise indicated, identical with Kuhn’s scientific paradigms. Finally, some modifications will be suggested to make the theory more happily applicable to the literary domain.
2-1-Grady’s Adaptations of Kuhn:
Grady shows that Kuhn’s refusal for the prevalent view of scientific progress is based on two grounds: first, that it is inadequate in accounting for these wholesale changes in the history of science, such as the Newtonian and Einsteinian. Second, this positivistic view of science is both untenable and hubristic.

Kuhn uses the term ‘crisis’ to refer to the situation that precedes any scientific revolution. According to Kuhn, for any revolution to take place, there must be some prerequisites, the most decisive among which being “observational anomalies between theory and experience.” As scientists work to explore natural phenomena according to an existing paradigm, they will be faced by certain anomalies which raise a discrepancy between the phenomena they confront and the theoretical framework within which they are working. Primarily, these anomalies are discarded and ignored. But this will lead, at length, to the old theories being replaced by something entirely new. And the anomalies, first quarried but then docketed, will turn to the status of the expected in the new theories. The second prerequisite is what Grady, employing a term Kuhn did not, and to account the malleability of literature to non-paradigmatic factors, terms as ‘political factors’: social, political and cultural currents, national pride, rivalries, ingrained prejudice, religious belief, etc. And it is by extending the significance of these factors, which Kuhn leaves undeveloped, that Grady is to develop the concepts of aesthetic and critical paradigms:

Given that literary study lacks the experimental practice of hard science, the influence of such political and non-discursive factors as ideology, self-interest and prejudice can be expected to play an even larger role in the on-going critical debates in this sector, and this opening to non-paradigmatic factors in explaining paradigm shift is a crucial one in my use of Kuhn’s concept, and I should note it is a relatively undeveloped portion of his theory.

Grady employs Kuhn’s concept of the paradigm to speak about aesthetic and critical paradigms. For him, the aesthetic paradigm is:

a set of notions and practices including, but not limited to, assumptions to what constitutes an authentic literary art-work and of what is of value in such art; notions of unity, time and space and of aspects of form and structure; ideas of what subject-matter was inherently poetic and what was not; assumptions of the value or lack of it of literature’s mimesis of ‘reality’- these and allied concepts to be discussed below—more often implied than stated, and when stated more often asserted than justified—often proved more basic to how a critic read and interpreted Shakespeare than the ideologies and critical methodologies claimed by these critics...
Thus, to Grady, these paradigms, and the assumption taken for granted in them, are more basic than the ideologies and the critical ‘isms’ (such as Marxism, Structuralism, etc.), critical schools whose relevance is only granted in so far as they draw on these critical categories.

Granting the differences between science and the arts, Grady holds that Kuhn’s theory still proves applicable to the humanities for it is “so well grounded in a kind of sociology of research communities, some of the characteristics of which transcend the differences between objects of knowledge.”

According to Grady, one advantage of the concept of the paradigm is the rethinking of the social dimension of art: even in its interaction with social life, art has developed its own autonomous history, which consists of a series of changes to culminate in some aesthetic revolutions analogous to though in some respects different from to the scientific revolutions delineated by Kuhn. Another immediate advantage of the notion of paradigm is that it allows us to think of competing or symbiotic paradigms (the coexistence of late Romanticism and realism in the Victorian period is the best example of symbiosis) co-existing in the same chronological period. The paradigm, moreover, is constituted by an “intersubjective decision- that the new paradigm must be accepted by a larger interpretive community, or otherwise is discarded as being irrelevant. The acceptance of a single aesthetic paradigm would account for the so-called a unitary Spirit of the Age.

The concept of the paradigm, so argues Grady, proves preferable to other three alternative concepts: ‘aesthetic sphere’, ‘discursive formations’ and ‘ideology’. The paradigm concept sounds more flexible than the Frankfurt school’s concept of the aesthetic sphere according to which there is one long post-Enlightenment period of modernity. The ‘paradigm’ can account for the movements and transitions in the ‘aesthetic’ categories more than the ‘aesthetic sphere’ does. Moreover, the aesthetic sphere is itself most usefully conceived as a paradigm.

The concept of the paradigm, Grady avers, is also preferable to Foucault’s concept of ‘discursive formations’ which Frank Lentricchia employs to account for changes in aesthetic periodization. Grady’s Grady voices two objections against Lentricchia’s account: first, Lentricchia, in his attempt to explain, according to the Foucauldian model, the phenomenon of the unpublished poets, such as the early Robinson and Frost, considers them as being subject to a repressive poetic discipline in the Foucauldian sense. To Grady, these unpublished poets are “unfortunate enough to be working in a paradigm unacceptable to the hegemonic cultural institutions of their day acting as an interpretive community.” Second, Foucault’s ‘discursive formations’ are hermetically autonomous, while the aesthetic is related to and conditioned by social forces.

The paradigm, according to Grady, is also more workable than Althusser’s concept of ‘ideology’. The ‘paradigm’ is less global and totalistic than ‘ideology.
The ‘paradigms’, scientific and aesthetic, are “bodies of knowledge and techniques which one consciously learns: there is a distance between the self who knows and the subject matter assimilated.”\textsuperscript{xi} In contrast to ideology, which operates as lenses whereby the self views reality, as a system of beliefs inextricably fixed with the knowing subject, the paradigm is separate from those who work in, with, or against it.

Aesthetic paradigms, just like scientific paradigms, are subject to periodical shifts. But Grady points to two differences between Kuhn’s scientific paradigms on the one hand, and aesthetic and critical paradigms on the other hand. First, Kuhn’s ‘paradigm shift’ is preceded by a crisis emerging from growing anomalies between the existing theories and experimental observations. This is not viable with regard to aesthetic paradigms. Instead, Grady suggests that “For periods of representational art, we might posit a slowly forming gap emerging between the changing everyday life and the artistic forms seeking to represent it.”\textsuperscript{xii} However, the relation between art and social life is an oblique terrain in Grady’s formulations of ‘aesthetic paradigms’, and one that will be minutely examined shortly below. Second, while Kuhn scientific paradigms are brought about by sharp breaks between the succeeding paradigms, the old paradigm being completely replaced by an entirely new one, this cannot be “transferred wholesale to a theory of aesthetic paradigms, which on the whole display marked features of continuity.”\textsuperscript{xiii}

With regard to the forces that lead to a shift in the aesthetic paradigm, Grady discerns four mechanisms involved in any paradigm shift that precedes a new aesthetic period: the formal, the economic, the psychological, and the semiotic.

In the formal level, a paradigm is replaced if it gets depleted, when it is experienced as being completed, and no longer liable to any innovation. By the economic level is meant the push to a new paradigm by the surrounding capitalist environment. Art is treated, in the capitalist West, as a commodity whose value, like any other commodity, depends on its novelty. The old modes of artistic expression are replaced by the new ones to cope with the new emerging tastes. The psychological dynamic consists in the so-called Oedipal desire by the new artist to slay or castrate the old artistic fathers. It can be broadly viewed as a desire of the present to revolt against the past. At the semiological level, the works and style of a previous artistic period turn out to be signifiers of that period in the course of being read and experienced. The autonomous style of a period becomes iconization can be seen with the great writers, most notably Shakespeare.\textsuperscript{xiv}

As far as the critical paradigms are concerned, Grady shows that they are more akin to and identical with scientific paradigms than aesthetic ones are. Like scientific paradigms, they are academically institutionalized, being shared by a certain community, similar to the Kuhn’s scientific communities. Moreover, critical paradigms employ the same apparatus of spreading scientific knowledge, such as journals, periodicals, and follow relatively similar research methodologies.
The shift in critical paradigms is subject to many factors: they are influenced by the prevailing aesthetic paradigm at any given moment; in addition, they are subject to political ideologies. Moreover, they are affected by instrumentalization and institutionalization deeply rooted in modern capitalist society.\textsuperscript{xv}

Grady discerns two critical paradigms that have shaped the ways the Shakespearean text is read and approached in the twentieth century: the Modernist and the Postmodernist paradigms. Under the first title, he lists the ‘spatial hermeneutics’ of G. Wilson Knight, the historical method of T.M.W. Tillyard, and the textual strategies of the New Criticism. These works, Grady reasons, are characterized by three common features: the centrality of ‘organic unity’, the rigid distinction between art and other forms of popular culture, and the dominance of professionalism on the critical practice. Cited under the umbrella term ‘postmodernism’ are three main paradigms: Deconstruction, New Historicism and Cultural Materialism, and Feminism. The Postmodernist paradigms bequeathed from the Modernist one the dominance of professionalism. But the other two features (‘organic unity’ and hierarchical distinctions) are depleted and now turned culturally irrelevant:

The relevant characteristics are the abandonment of organic unity as an aesthetic value and practice and the overthrow of a series of formerly privileged hierarchical oppositions through a Postmodernist anti-hierarchical impulse (as, for example, in the collapse of the High Modernist distinction between ‘art’ and ‘popular culture’ or in the championing of the various Others of Western rationality like women and Third World peoples).\textsuperscript{xvi}

Thus, it is these “relevant characteristics” that justified for Grady grouping these movements into a single paradigm. And it is the existence or the absence of these relevant characteristics that mark the shift from one paradigm to another (in this case from Modernism to Postmodernism).

2-2: Grady’s Concepts in Perspective
The critique presented below is based on many grounds, and it aims to show that the formulations given so far of the ‘aesthetic’ and ‘critical’ paradigms are, unless properly modified, hardly viable to account for the transitions that take place in the aesthetic and critical domains.

2-2-1: The totalitarian nature of the ‘paradigm’
The first dimension of critique has to do with the fact that the notion of the paradigm, as presented in these attempts, is a totalitarian one: the paradigm, according to these theorists, is equated with a literary period, and that every period in the history of literature is coloured by the dominance of one harmonious
paradigm; this entails that the movement from one period to the next is contaminant to and marked by a shift from one paradigm to another. The concept of the paradigm, thus, turns incapable to account for the protean and pluralistic nature of the aesthetic and critical fads. The totalitarian scent is smelled in these attempts because of, perhaps, the domination of the original version of Kuhn’s observations. According to Kuhn, after a paradigm war between competing paradigms, only one will dominate, while the others fade away:

What is surprising...is that such initial divergences should ever largely disappear. For they do disappear to a very considerable extent and than apparently once and for all. Furthermore, their disappearance is usually caused by the triumph of one of the pre-paradigm schools.\textsuperscript{vii}

The totalitarian tendency is echoed by Mcgrath who cites, as emblematic examples of paradigmatic studies, E.M.W. Tillyard’s \textit{The Elizabethan World Picture}, M.H. Abrams’ \textit{The Mirror and the Lamp}, and Walter Houghton’s \textit{The Victorian Frame of Mind}.\textsuperscript{viii} And it is blindingly obvious how totalistic Tillyard’s work is considered now, let alone the other examples. Motivated by the same spirit, moreover, Easthope, enthusiastically theorizing for the emergence of cultural studies, writes about the decline of the old paradigm, that of literary studies:

In a sentence, I shall argue that the old paradigm has collapsed, that the moment of crisis symptomatically registered in concern with theory is now passing, and that a fresh paradigm has emerged.\textsuperscript{xix}

To Easthope, then, the old paradigm of literary studies, which began in the 1930s, is now defunct, worn out and battered, giving way to a new paradigm, that of cultural studies, after a moment of crisis in the 1960s.

Grady also falls prey to this totalistic view of the notion of the paradigm, speaking of a Modernist paradigm that replaced Romanticism, and which in turn was replaced by Postmodernism. This totalistic tendency in Grady’s treatment is more often implicitly put into effect than expressed directly, using some strategies and implied assumptions which we try to unravel bellow.

This totalistic pitfall is grounded on three assumptions, all of which, it will be argued, are baseless. These are the assumption that aesthetic and critical trends are exhaustible; and that they are exclusive; and that periods in literary history are mostly homogenous.

The first orthodox assumption is that any of these movements is exhaustible. That’s to say that any movement, aesthetic or critical, once outdated, is depleted once and for all. This pitfall, be it remembered, stems from the analogy these theorists make between the scientific paradigm shifts and the literary ones, an analogy no less misleading than the analogy, denounced by these theorists, between science and art. Thus, Kuhn's "will largely disappear" and
Easthope's 'collapsing' paradigms of 'Literary Studies' quoted above are some examples of this tendency. Consequently, Grady holds, in the discussion of the formal mechanism of paradigm shift, that the artistic forms of the old paradigm are depleted, turning non-productive anymore.

Examples are bound to show that this assumption is unsustainable. In the aesthetic domain, Romanticism provides just an illustrative example. Though Romanticism is always regarded as a reaction against Neo-classical poetry, some writers refer to the ‘persistence of Neo-classical poetic practices in the writings of the Romantics.”xx Thus, it is never exhausted. On the other hand, the after-effect of Romanticism never faded away, but persisted, to pave the way for such movements as Impressionism, Symbolism and Surrealism, in their insistence on the “subjective view of reality rather than the objective copy.”xxi Moreover, Romanticism reappeared in the 1930s, in the poetry of Dylan Thomas and others.

In the critical domain, the same holds true, for in no sense can an approach of criticism be exhausted. The most delineative example is of Formalist criticism, which is always cited by Grady and Easthope alike as a now depleted source of critical insights. Not surprisingly, Formalist criticism proved capable of renovation. Ironically enough, in the same year Grady and Easthope published their books, (1991), Marie-Lure Ryan made a brilliant attempt to readapt the formalist principles to the study of narrative. In the introduction to her Possible Worlds, Artificial Intelligence and Narrative Theory, she writes:

...since my approach is largely formalist.... Through this choice of models, I hope to address the growing dissatisfaction with the formalist approaches to literature and the current feeling of crisis in narratology (as voiced in Remmon Kenan 1988). Rumors of the demise of formalism and narratology may be greatly exaggerated.22

Thus, granting that the formalist approach undergoes a kind of crisis, exaggerated though it be, Ryan denies that it is demising, as Grady and Easthope like to say. Such attempts as Ryan’s prove that the formalist approach is far from exhausted, defunct and battered.

The second assumption refers to the idea, echoing what happens in the scientific field, that these movements cannot coexist, that the spread of one completely excludes any other movement; that only one dominates at a time, to the detriment of the others. However, in comparison to the other two, Easthope and Mcgrath, Grady seems the least guilty of this notorious assumption, for he admits the coexistence of competing or symbiotic paradigms, such as the coexistence of realism and romanticism in the Victorian period.

But many tip-offs are at issue here. For it should be noticed that this is the one and only example he mentions throughout his study. Elsewhere his treatment always gives the impression of one unitary paradigm dominating at a time,
excluding all other paradigms. Grady, moreover, suggests that realism, which echoed the Enlightenment rationalism, was accommodated with Romanticism/Symbolism in a division of labour (the novel vs. the lyric with drama divided)\textsuperscript{23} But this account is hardly acceptable for two reasons: Firstly, it entails that paradigms are genre-specific which goes in contrast to the Weltanschauung effect Grady adopts and which is going to be discussed below. Secondly, even if granted, in Gramscian terms, that this plurality of paradigms consists of a dominant and oppositional paradigms, this is out of place here for both paradigms are equally dominant in the time mentioned.

The third, equally unsound assumption refers to the fact that, in their conceptualization of literary history, these paradigm-inspired models often leave the impression of uninterrupted, synchronically homogenous literary periods. These periods are conceived as being dominated by a common system of thought, homogenous and harmonious, however ramified its manifestations. This is suggested in a correspondence Grady draws between the concept of ‘paradigm’ and that of ‘Weltanschauung-effect’, a sense of general characteristics shared by the products of a given era of history. According to Grady, these general characteristics, themselves manifestations of a unitary spirit of the age or ‘Zeitgeist’, consist in a single world-view, and “would in this context be the outcome of the acceptance of a single aesthetic paradigm by large numbers of artists and writers.”\textsuperscript{24} It is hardly justified that Grady, whose perspective is a postmodernist one, would adopt the Zeitgeist. Although, soon later, he writes that in these periods of relatively unitary paradigms, there would be, in Gramscian terms Grady favours, dominant paradigms, with their corollaries of oppositional, temporary paradigms, etc., he leaves this portion undeveloped. To accept the existence of the unitary spirit would not justify the existence of the plurality of paradigms at any given period of history.

To create this impression of homogeneity, theorists working according to the paradigm-inspired models follow many strategies. The first is the deliberate omissions and squelching of counter-instances, as is the case in Grady’s treatment of E.M.W. Tillyard, which implies that Tillyard’s account of the Elizabethan world picture was totally dominant during the 1940s and 1950s and that it underwent a crisis in the 1960s until it was seriously challenged, irremediably declined and finally replaced in the 1970s onward. To conduct this account, Grady made serious deliberate omissions to which Graham Bradshaw petulantly refers:

Grady’s omissions continue that ‘major revisionist effort’. That he altogether should ignore skeptical or hostile contemporary responses to Tillyard like D.C. Allen’s would be disquieting enough in an allegedly historical study. But that Wilbor Sander’s \textit{Dramatist and the Received Idea} and Sigurd Burckardt’s \textit{Shakespearean Meanings} are mentioned only in passing. Sander’s is acknowledged in one sentence, while the brief reference to Burckardt suggests that his untimely suicide still left the work to be done in the seventies and eighties. Astonishingly, Rossiter’s \textit{Angel with Horns} and Rabkin’s \textit{Shakespeare
and the Common Understanding are not discussed at all; they don't even find a place in Grady's copious footnotes or very lengthy bibliography. Rabkin's important later work Shakespeare and the Problem of Meaning isn't mentioned either. 25 Grady conducts other omissions in his discussion of the critical paradigms listed under the wider umbrella term ‘the postmodern Shakespeare’. He discerns three critical paradigms: Deconstruction, New Historicism and Cultural Materialism and Feminist criticism. Though the existence and prevalence of such paradigms is beyond any dispute, this procedure has inevitably led to the omission of other, no less innovative works and tendencies in the Shakespeare criticism in the last decades. Two of these works can be cited here: one is a semiotic analysis conducted by Alessandro Serpieri and the other is a psychological analysis, according to the Lacanian model, by Philip Armstrong. 26 Also lastingly important are the structuralist critical studies, such like linguistic criticism, stylistics, pragmatic and semiotic studies, Keir Elam’s attempts being just one clear example of these trends, totally overlooked and written off in Grady’s survey. 27 These instances, and other works of the same ilk, would render abominably indented Grady’s claim that “in American Shakespeare studies, the impact of properly structuralist methodologies was decidedly limited.” 28 The risk Grady runs by the omission of these semiotic and pragmatic approaches to Shakespeare lies in the fact that it is done on behalf of Deconstruction, for the two approaches, as some critics rightly hold, are in sharp contrast to each other, especially in their underlying assumptions. 29 On the other hand, among the unfortunate casualties of Grady’s omissions are the Ecocritical analyses being carried out of the Shakespeare’s plays. 30 Even if these attempts cannot be granted as paradigms, they did exist, an existence blurred and overlooked by these paradigm-inspired literary and critical histories, as the one enthusiastically conducted by Hugh Grady.

The second homogenizing strategy is betrayed by the working out of rigid dichotomies as between Modernism and Postmodernism, dichotomies which Grady’s own postmodern method claims to have deconstructed. Formulating these periodical changes in purely oppositional and increasingly referential terms gives the impression of unique distinctive and homogenous constructs being contrasted to each other. Beleaguered by such strategies, Kathi Weeks makes this point tersely:

The homogenization of modernism and postmodernism that is required for the paradigm debate is the product of a complex sequence of reductions. The complete strategy involves a series of conflations that reduce modernism to a single opponent which can be clearly contrasted to the postmodernist paradigm, itself. This sense constructed through a comparable series of conflations. 31 of homogeneity, which caters to these reductionists, would blur the distinctive features and unique force of the two poles of the dichotomy. It is the process of gathering these otherwise heterogeneous and divergent theories in one whole, with their
commonalities underscored, however nuanced they are, and their differences eclipsed, however irreconcilable they are, only to mould them into a whole to be negatively contrasted to another whole likewise constructed.

Nested in this homogenizing strategy is a blurring of categorization of paradigms, always based on fuzzy rules of alignment, according to which certain paradigms are aligned together for they are said to share common grounds and are distinguished from other paradigms from which they differ in certain respects. One example could be the case of Surrealism and its place between the Modernist and Postmodernist modes of representation. Surrealism contrasted the Modernist aesthetics of interpretation with the Postmodernist aesthetics of sensation, a contrast similar to the more systematic one drawn by Lyotard between the Modernist ‘discursive’ and the Postmodernist ‘figural’ modes of representation. Building on these distinctions, Scott Lash, among others, argues that Surrealism is a figural mode of signification, belonging, thus, to Postmodernism, rather than to Modernism. Thus, what has long been considered as a harmonious Modernist paradigm is in no sense unified, harmonious, or homogenous.

This sense of homogeneity percolates everywhere in Grady’s work. Nowhere is this more evident than in his bestowal of a sense of convergence on the otherwise divergent theoretical positions as those of Foucault and Habermas:

Increasingly, however, many of us have detected the beginnings of a theoretical convergence among these competing schools, the working through of the sibling rivalry. Given the theoretical valorizing of difference, break, heterogeneity, and disparateness involved in many of these trends, it would be overstating the case to speak of a 'synthesis'. Nevertheless a broad dialogue is beginning to take place that is producing what I would term a Postmodernist theoretical convergence, a version of which provides the theoretical scaffolding for the present study. (italics mine)

And though he makes this claim with regard to Postmodernism, he has already applied it, quite unjustifiably, to Modernism. Thus, in Grady’s Modernist paradigm, Tillyard’s purely historical method is aligned with New Criticism, with its anti-historical tendencies. In the same token, the Postmodernist paradigm is to comprise three main tendencies: Deconstruction, New Historicism and Cultural Materialism, and Feminism, the textual gist of the first being aligned with the contextual tendency of the second. The danger behind such alignment is that we may be satisfied with these general commonalities and, consequently, overlook the personal contributions each of these theories offers. Grady leaves unspecified the criteria according to which certain theories can be grouped together to form a paradigm: Are these thematic or periodic criteria? Why, for example, not to group Tillyard’s historical method with the later historically oriented approaches like New Historicism and Cultural Materialism, based on their common ground
of contextualizing literature? Tillyard’s method cherishes more affinities with these approaches than it does with the New Criticism. And why, on the other hand, not to align New Criticism with the later likewise textual approaches as Structuralism and Deconstruction? Even if granted with Grady that “in the new theoretical space opened by the post-structuralist revolution, the unlikeliest connections are now possible”\textsuperscript{34}, it can be asserted that the likeliest and unlikeliest disconnections are equally possible. The begging question that is left unsettled is as to what standards may justify the grouping of some theoretical positions under one paradigm.

In the same token, to speak of Postmodern ‘paradigms’, as Grady does, would add to the confusion of terms and concepts: is Postmodernism a paradigm or it contains many paradigms? This must invite him to modify his terminological kit, speaking, instead, of sub-paradigms that are themselves part of a larger super-paradigm, in this case Postmodernism. Besides, Grady should give an adequate account for the intra-paradigmatic distinctions (distinctions among the theories of the same paradigm) and inter-paradigmatic relations (relations among different paradigms.)

Thus, it has been clear how the paradigm-inspired models run the risk of totalizing these paradigms, turning them far less happily applicable for the versatile and mercurial nature of the aesthetic and critical fields. In these fields, unlike the scientific ones, paradigms may dominate, but never exclude the others. They may hold the centre, but not the whole.

2-2-2; Non-technical use of Kuhn’s terminology

Another point of attack against the notion of the ‘aesthetic’ and ‘critical’ paradigms is that it employs a non-technical and often pre-theoretical use of the notion of the paradigm as delineated by Kuhn. These attempts to adapt the notion to the field of literary studies seem to have focused their attention on certain simplified aspects of Kuhn’s theory, such as the idea that the transition from the old paradigm to the new one is a revolutionary one, preceded by a crisis state, thus, leaving unexplored other, no less significant aspects which Kuhn addressed in considerable detail. Even if granted that these aspects prove inapplicable to literature, it has to be stated that they are. This has left considerable lacuna in these adaptations.

One illuminating example is of the idea often posed by Kuhn of paradigm competition. According to Kuhn, in the time of crisis, there are more than one candidate paradigms, out of which only one will emerge as more valid than the others: “To be accepted as a paradigm”, Kuhn envisions, ”a theory must seem better than its competitors.”\textsuperscript{35} Elsewhere, discussing the ways a crisis closes, he points out that the most familiar way is when “a new candidate for paradigm emerges, and a battle of its acceptance ensues.”\textsuperscript{36} These ‘paradigm wars’ are never addressed by the adherents of ‘aesthetic’ and ‘critical’ paradigms. For example, what are the competing paradigms over which Modernism triumphed? And what are the ones among which cultural studies emerged? And so on.

A second example where Grady, not only does not address a point Kuhn did, but rather contradicts him, is that of novelty. According to Kuhn, “Normal
science does not aim at novelties of fact or theory.”37 “For in science, as in playing card experiment, novelty only emerges with difficulty, manifested by resistance against a background provided by expectation.”38 But what happens in the literary domain, in some literary trends at least, is the contrary: novelty is ceaselessly sought. Nowhere is this more evident than it is with ‘manifestos’ such as the Futurist and Symbolist ones, where it is generally claimed, though not necessarily proved, that the art of the preceding period no longer exists and that a new era is inaugurated, and that a novel art is to be henceforth produced. In these manifestos, shifts are conceived as sea-change not as resulting from a perennial process of incremental steps.

2-2-3: Paradigm Shifts and Literature’s Relative Autonomy

The way a paradigm shift takes place is so telling an example of how simplified Grady’s version of the theory is. While Kuhn has taken great pains in detailing it and been preoccupied in conducting a patient analysis of the mechanisms of this change, Grady only tackled it in passing. The three chapters Kuhn devoted to the analysis of the anomalies, crisis, and shift, Chapters VI-VIII,39 turned out to only one page and a half with Grady.40 But his treatment is also elusive and, in this point, self-contradictory. In Kuhn’s theory, the shift results from an awareness of anomalies or counterinstances, which point to a discrepancy between theory and experimental observation. Admitted, these anomalies lead to a crisis-state, when scientists are aware of the need for new theories to account for these anomalies. In this point, a number of competing theories emerges, out of which one will prove the most qualified for this. In this case, the anomalies in the previous theories will turn to the expected in the new one, and a paradigm shift can be said to have taken place. Exposing his view on how a paradigm shift in the aesthetic and critical domains takes place, Grady writes:

In the aesthetic sphere, clearly such a mechanism of change is untenable. For periods of representational art, we might posit a slowly forming gap emerging between the changing everyday life and the artistic forms seeking to represent it--clearly one of the factors involved in the Modernist revolution--but artistic forms can never be reduced to their relation to the social.

But the changing history of art-forms is not hermetically autonomous. Adorno liked to say that each art-object was a unique monad, always carrying traces of the social totality in which it was embedded. In its relative autonomy, the aesthetic paradigm's changes are linked to those of social history, but neither directly nor simply. Characteristically, social history is mediated into the aesthetic paradigm by the displacements and transformations it works on form.

Many points of special significance can be made here: first, how can it be that “the history of art forms has a definite autonomy” while at the same time he admits that “the changing history of art forms is not hermetically autonomous”; but, rather, it is only relatively so. Second, like most treatments of relative autonomy of art, literature included, Grady’s falls prey to the proliferation of the non-
statements, which problematize, rather than solve this dilemma, a
dilemma that Tony Bennet traces back to Marxist aesthetics:

In these respects, Marxist concern with the question of
literature's relative autonomy constitutes the locus of an attempted
(but impossible) reconciliation of, on the one hand, an approach to
the analysis of the composition and functioning of
forms of writing in the contexts of the historical circumstances of
their production and social deployment with, on the other, an
immanent analysis of literature understood as a distinctive, trans-
historical semiotic system. And it is the ‘impossibility’ of this reconciliation that led these theorists to define
the relative autonomy of art in a series of non-statements. Irked with the fatuity of
these circular arguments, Bennet writes:

As a consequence, Marxist conceptions of literature's relative
autonomy typically result in a proliferation of not-statements:
literature is not ideology and it is not science, but it is not entirely not ideology either…Nor is it entirely not science…

Thus, in Grady’s statement: “In its relative autonomy, the aesthetic paradigm
changes are linked to those of social history, but neither directly nor simply”
(emphasis mine) is just an example of Bennet’s notorious non-statements, and is a prevarication in this maddeningly thorny problem. The concept of ‘relative autonomy’ which Grady makes a cornerstone in his account of paradigm shifts, and which he attributes to the Frankfurt school thinkers, especially Adorno, is originally a Marxist concept. For, apart from the account of vulgar Marxism, which envisions literature as a mere reflection of the economic base, thus grudging it any autonomous history, new Marxist accounts deny this deterministic view to have been adopted by Marx or Engles. It is, rather, unflinchingly punctured as resulting from the transition from Marx to Marxism:

Marx is clear that these two aspects of society (base and superstructure) do not
form a symmetrical relationship, dancing a harmonious minute hand-in-hand
throughout history. Each element of a society’s superstructure—art, law, politics,
religion—has its own tempo of development, its own internal evolution, which is not
reducible to mere expression of the class struggle or the state of economy. Art, as
Trotsky comments, has a very high degree of autonomy; it is not tied in a simple
one-to-one way to the mode of production.

But, as we have said, the concept of relative autonomy is by no means a solution,
but is itself the problem. For the question to be posed is: To what extent is
literature autonomous? It is left unsettled. One reason behind this may be the
fact that, unlike scientific factors and variables, the social factors can not be
studied in the same precision of science: they are complex, ramified, and multi-
layered. Granting that literature is not sequestered from other social activities,
these theorists, Grady included, are unable to translate this relation into clear-cut
terms.
We may now return to Grady’s suggested alternative for Kuhn’s anomalies, that of a ‘slowly forming gap emerging between the changing everyday life and the artistic forms seeking to represent it.’ The question to be asked here is: Is this gap a necessary and sufficient condition for a shift in the aesthetic and critical paradigms? However, Grady seems to embrace a highly deterministic view, especially in his account of the economic level of paradigm shifts.

Nor is it useful to recourse to Grady’s four dynamics to explain the mechanism whereby the shift in the aesthetic paradigm takes place. Whereas the first three dynamics (formal, economic, and psychological) may be considered as causes to the paradigm shift, the fourth (the semiological) is only the result. Besides, Grady’s treatment of these dynamics, especially the formal, is unjustifiably brief. Grady, moreover, leaves unsettled the questions of whether any of these dynamics is a sufficient or necessary factor to bring the paradigm shift in the aesthetic forms. These dynamics, it may be added, do not show the direction of that shift.

More maintainable, I think, is the account given by the Russian formalists for literary evolution. In their effort to pinpoint the criteria of literariness, or the ground on which to consider a given writing as literary or not, the Russian formalists used the concept of ‘defamiliarization’, according to which literature always tends to defamiliarize or make strange the raw material out of which it evolved. Defamiliarization (also termed ‘estrangement’ by some formalists) work on two levels. The first is the standard language, whose rules and conventions are liable to be defamiliarized by literary language. The second is the literary rules, codes and conventions themselves, whose existence is, according to this theory, by no means permanent. The effect of literature, accordingly, can only be achieved by their constant renewal. The taken-for-grantedness of the old forms is always destabilized in favour of the new ones. Concurrent with defamiliarization is another process of ‘laying bare the device’ whereby, for any literary form to be defamiliarized, its devices must be laid bare for the reader: the process of defamiliarization is only self-consciously undertaken. “In this way, literature is only a play of form on form. It uses one sort of devices to chisel the ground from beneath another, usually canonical or revered set of devices and, in doing so, wrestles reality away fro the terms of seeing they propose, thereby making it the focus of renewed interest and attentiveness.”

Thus, the formalist account does not fetishize the literary devices for their own sake, but as backgrounds against which the new ones are to be foregrounded. This formalist account is both diachronic (for it demystifies the process whereby literary evolution takes place) and synchronic (for the old and new forms, the defamiliarized and the defamiliarizing, can and do coexist in the same literary text). Accordingly, the old forms are by no means fossilized: they are always present. It is by having recourse to them that renovation in literature is made possible.

But however solid this argument, it can answer some of the questions, not all, for “the Formalists conspicuously failed to explain either the particular...
direction of the path of literary development or its historical curvature." The Formalist argument does explain the necessity of change, but the ‘direction of the path of literary development’ is better explained by the relation to social forces to which literature is pliable, a point unpalatably denied by the Formalists. This argument may also fall short in accounting for the dizzying rapidity of change in the new-fangled literary fads, with no enough space left to create this sense for estrangement.

However, a very decisive factor in the shift of the aesthetic paradigm is the technological advancement, a factor always overlooked in the models above exposed. It is operational in two levels: direct and indirect. In the former, we can notice that aesthetic forms do correspond, to a lesser or greater extent, to new technological discoveries. These discoveries enable artists to use means and devices otherwise unavailable to them, electronic literature being just one illustrative example. And we cannot but positively answer Marie-Lure Ryan’s affirmative question: ‘Will new media produce new narratives?’ Indirectly, these scientific views are mediated by a perception they shape about reality. The perception of reality is in no sense fixed and given, but is constantly modified due to data provided by scientific investigations. And it is this consciousness, constantly altered and modified, that finds its expression in the works of arts.

Consequently, another pitfall of Grady’s account, in this point, is that it seems to be realistically oriented, especially in making a direct relation between ‘the changing everyday life’ and ‘the artistic forms seeking to represent it’. This account is based on the assumption that what is represented in literature is the raw material of everyday life. But it is now generally agreed that what is represented in literature is a conceptually processed reality. According to the postmodern thought, in which Grady claims his thesis is deeply rooted, there is no unmediated reality. Any artistic form represents one, among many others, conceptions of reality, a conception mediated by the way that reality is only cognitively accessed.

2-2-4: Paradigm vs. Ideology

Another example of self-contradiction in Grady’s theory is the comparison he draws between the concepts of Kuhn’s ‘paradigm’ and Althusser’s ‘ideology’, preferring the former for it is ‘less global and totalistic a concept’. On the one hand, Grady grants the paradigm an epistemological status, determining our knowledge of reality, to which, accordingly, we can only have a mediated access:

But the anti-positivist thrust of Kuhn's concept of paradigms as necessary mediations between us and our knowledge of nature—the paradigm as an epistemological category—points to a fruitful direction for the application of Kuhn to literary theory. Kuhn devoted a good deal of his energy to demonstrating that evidence was much less decisive in accounting for what was accepted and not accepted in scientific debates than had been assumed in older positivistic models of the history of science, since, as he demonstrates, what counts as evidence is highly dependent on the paradigm through which the evidence is
interpreted (pp. 77-90); there can be no 'direct', unmediated access to nature as such.  

But, on the other hand, Grady asserts that the paradigm, unlike ideology, does not form any lenses by which to see reality:

but the paradigm is much less global and totalistic a concept: aesthetic and scientific paradigms, for example, operate in separate spheres as bodies of knowledge and techniques which one consciously learns; there is a distinct distance between the self who learns and the subject-matter assimilated. Nevertheless it is finally separate from the decentred self who works in, with, and against it.

Another self-contradiction in his treatment of ideology lies in its relative relation to the aesthetic paradigm. While early in his work he declares that the aesthetic paradigms are “more basic to how a critic read and interpreted Shakespeare than the ideologies and critical methodologies claimed by these critics”, he later asserts that the change in aesthetic paradigms are “mediated by lived experience and ideology.”

Though he accepts so matter-of-factly the role ideology epistemologically plays in shaping the critic’s attitudes, Grady’s position as to the extent to which it does is blurred. But, surely it is a lesser extent than it does in Althusser’s formulation of the concept.

2-2-5: Paradigm vs. Discourse: the unpublished writers
Grady prefers the notion of the paradigm to Foucault’s ‘discourse’, claiming that, while aesthetic paradigms are relatively autonomous, Foucault’s ‘discursive formations’ are hermetically so. However, this is far from accurate. For though “Foucault did not believe, as some Marxists do, that the economic base determines what can be said and thought at a particular time, instead, he saw the relation between economics, social structures and discourses as being a complex interaction with none of the terms of the equation being dominant.” Though not determined by economic factors and social relations, ‘discursive formations’ do intersect with and are still related to them in a complex interaction. Moreover, Lentricchia, whose version of Foucault Grady mainly discusses, points out that any historian of literature, American literature say, needs to study the poetic writing of other nations at some stages, “and he will need to pinpoint areas of discursive intersection where literary, philosophical, scientific and religious modes of writing find a point of contact.” Thus, this search for discursive intersection shows that Foucault’s ‘discursive formations’ are far from being intrinsively autonomous

Equally flawed is the attempt Grady makes to belittle Lentricchia’s account, employing a Foucauldian model, for the phenomenon of the ‘unpublished poets’, Frost and Robinson before 1913, for example. These poets, Grady laments, "are unfortunate enough to work in a paradigm not acceptable by the hegemonic institutions of their time. He prefers this account to Lentricchia’s, to explain this
in Foucauldian terms as being subject to repressive poetic disciplines:

Robert Frost in the earlier phase of his career, Mendel, criminals, and the insane are alike monsters whose forced exclusion allows dominant cultural establishments to appropriate to themselves poetic truth, biological truth, rationality, sanity, social value, and well-being.\(^56\)

These repressions are not removable at all, but change from domination to domination. Consequently, once these repressive techniques are changed, the repressed artists are reimbursed in a rise the natural corollary of which is another repression over other forces:

The dramatic rise of both Robinson and Frost after 1913 was not the result of a collective coming to good sense on the part of magazine editors, critics, contemporary poets and other instruments of a repressive poetic discipline that had confined Robinson and Frost to speaking in a void. Strictly speaking, by Foucault’s lights, Robinson and Frost were not librated from incarceration by the modernist revolt; they were merely taken into new quarters of confinement, where under the authority of a different kind of repression their kinds of repression were granted the privilege of the poetic, even as other kinds were excluded and regulated to the status of the ‘old-fashioned’.\(^57\)

In a provocative attempt to account for the phenomenon of the ‘unpublished poets’ according to Foucault’s ‘exclusionary mechanisms’ of discourse, Lentricchia points that, in any field, scientific or literary, “Foucault says that it is not enough to speak the truth— one must be “within the truth” (dans le vrai)” \(^58\)

Thus, a writer’s achievement, no matter how innovative and ground-breaking it be, must remain within the domain of the sayable in the time it is written if it is to be acknowledged the status of authentic discourse:

then one had better assent to the rules of discursive policy by placing oneself within the confines of those systems that determine biological or poetic truth for one’s time. To refuse to conform is to accept a place, whether one intends to or not, alongside society’s more dramatically visible outcasts: the criminals, the insane, racial minorities, and the indignant, who are brutally and unhesitatingly subjected to the power that divides and silences.\(^59\)

Objectively viewed, Lentricchia’s account, using a Foucauldian apparatus, is more durable than Grady’s who seems to espouse a metaphysical view: ‘unfortunate enough’. However, in the last resort, both seem to arrive at the same result: that these works have been subject to the exclusionary power of certain institutions which enjoy dominance or hegemony in a given period of time. On the
other hand, Grady makes a selective use of Gramsci when he refers to ‘hegemonic institutions’. We have already argued that Grady never develops a stance about hegemonic and marginal paradigms, an idea patiently explored by Foucault, especially in his discussion of the exclusionary mechanisms of discourses.

A close example of unpublished writers, of how genius may be rendered a bane, not a boon, is that of the Shavian drama: Shaw’s plays of the 1980s and the early Edwardian era were panned by critics for not fitting in the traditional division of genres. *Major Barbara: A Discussion Play* (1905) is just an illustrative example. *John Bull’s Other Island* (1894) was considered as too discursive and was, accordingly, regarded as “not a play”. Primarily and provisionally, Shaw’s plays bedeviled critics, and only later were they approved, their artistic and dramatic achievement fully appreciated and their status duly reimbursed. According to the Foucauldian model, though Shaw was speaking the truth, he is not in the truth (dans le vrai) for not conforming to rules of writing consented in the time he was writing these plays.

In addition to the difficulty of explaining the phenomenon of the unpublished writes, Grady’s model would face another problem with regard to this phenomenon: would such a paradigm-inspired literary history mention such writers in the discussion of the periods when their works were not published and appreciated or only in the later periods when they got the due attention of critics? If yes, one can mount the objection that they were not part of the paradigm of their periods. If no, this would blur the existence of these works in the periods in question and will, inevitably lead to omissions similar to the ones discussed above.

Lentricchia’s formulation of this Foucault-influenced model proves sounder than Grady’s formulation of the notions of ‘aesthetic’ and ‘critical’ paradigms. Foucault’s seems to provide a clear-cut vision of the heterogeneity of literary periods, especially the plurality of discourses in a given moment of time and its consequences of the domination of some discourses to the marginalization of others, an area Grady never satisfactorily treads. Foucault, moreover, took great pains to show the mechanisms of exclusion among discourses. Furthermore, this model is credited for the significance it attaches to the minor and marginalized literary figures. It, accordingly, escapes the totalistic tendency of Grady’s ‘paradigms’ as well as the ‘homogenous’ fallacies mentioned earlier. Foucault, in addition, assumes a very clear position with regard to the epistemological status of discourse by affirming that knowledge, of whatever kind, is but a perspective, among many others. Grady’s account, as was pointed out, seems self-contradictory as to whether the paradigm does or does not determine the consciousness of those working in, with, or against it.

2-2-6: The relation between critical and aesthetic paradigms

Though Grady’s main practical concern is with the Shakespeare criticism, thus mostly dealing with the ‘critical’ paradigm, his theoretical formulations are mostly devoted to the discussion of ‘aesthetic’ paradigms. His treatment of what
he calls ‘critical’ paradigms is unjustifiably thin. He shows that the relation between ‘aesthetic’ and ‘critical’ paradigms is asymmetrical, critical paradigms being influenced by aesthetic ones, not vice versa. But it is generally agreeable that critical paradigms exert a considerable influence on the aesthetic ones. Critical theories “have not been futile, but as working conceptions of the matters, end, and ordonnance of art, have been greatly effective in shaping the activities of creative artists. Even an aesthetic philosophy so abstract and seemingly academic as that of Kant can be shown to have modified the work of poets.”

The diversity and richness of aesthetic production is attributable, in part, to the complexity, diversity and richness in the critical insights over centuries. Besides, some critical theories may direct the creative writing by discovering and paying attention to previous arts mostly overlooked by prevalent theories, thus creating new possibilities of literary production. In addition, critical theories, just like scientific insights, may mediate the literary production by shaping the artist’s conception of reality. This is quite obvious in postmodern fiction, namely metafiction, where its practitioners are undoubtedly influenced by, on the one hand, the new critical theories in the field of narratology and, on the other hand, a sense, likewise created, mediated, and forcefully supported by these theories of plurality, uncertainty, and a belief in the breakdown of the traditional values and systems of cognition.

Conclusion:

The appeal of the paradigm-inspired models of literary history stems from their semi-scientific halo resulting from their being derived from an originally scientific-based model of Kuhn’s theory of ‘paradigm shifts’. But, however solid its results proved in the scientific domain, this model is, or at least the way it is presented in the above-mentioned attempts, hardly viable in the fields of literature and literary criticism. In these fields, it has been argued, it poses more problems than it solves. It never provides satisfactory explanations for the many problems it has set itself to address: evolution of forms, autonomy of literature, art’s relation to reality, marginalized writers, etc.

But, in order not to dispense with the many advantages it cherishes, it is not to be completely discarded. Rather, exponents of this approach must take into consideration many possible modifications and adjustments that would turn it more flexible and, consequently, more pliable to account for the complexity of literary phenomena:

Firstly, it is quite justified to search for configuration of aesthetic and critical paradigms to unite the general features of a group of works, large or small, as evolving around certain, implicitly or explicitly, acknowledged principles, forming certain paradigms, aesthetic or critical. But it must not rule out those writers whose work doesn’t go in line with these prevailing paradigms, as in the example of Shavian drama in the 1980s mentioned above.

Secondly, serious attempts must be made to account for the plurality of paradigms at any given period of time: the existence of a paradigm, no matter
how dominant it is, doesn’t mean the existence of no other paradigm. Rather, they coexist, cherishing a relation that is both complex and unstable. Paradigms hold the center, not the whole. This would evade the unfortunate consequences of the omissions Grady makes of the anti-Tillyardian tendencies in the 1940s and 1950s, to show how purely Tillyardian the academic atmosphere was in these decades. It would also account for the coexistence of such bedfellows, such as idealism and naturalism in the nineteenth century.

Thirdly, the emergence of a paradigm doesn’t mean the total demise of the previous ones. Rather, they remain to oscillate in a state of ebb and flow. Accordingly, it is quite groundless to assert, as Easthope did, that the paradigm of Literary Studies is defunct and worn out in favour of the emerging new paradigm of Cultural Studies. The same is applicable to the claims, mostly exaggerated, of the demise of the Formalist approach in critical theory.

Fourthly, the relation between art and real life is too complex to be so simplistically delineated in the way Grady does. To envision the shifts in the literary domain as resulting from ‘a slowly growing gap between the daily life and the artistic forms seeking to represent it’ would run the risk of relating literature, unmediatedly, to real life: a purely realistic stance, no doubt. The mechanisms of shifts Grady suggests need be modified in such a way as to account for the relation between art and what it represents.

Fifthly, given the coexistence of paradigms, this theory must be able to map the relation between these paradigms, with its corollaries of dominant paradigms and marginal ones, demonstrating, as clearly as possible, the repressive and exclusionary strategies which authorize some paradigms, rather than others, as institutionally authorized forms of knowledge, grudging the others as not-knowledge at all. This would give a satisfactory explanation for why some writers and works are excluded in some periods but are assigned credence in later periods.

Sixth, as far as the categorization of schools and paradigms is concerned, clear-cut rules of alignment must be enacted to show the criteria according to which certain movements are grouped together to form one paradigm. No doubt, there will be many possibilities available, for the ‘relevant characteristics’ can be viewed differently and their significance disputed if approached from different conceptual viewpoints.

Notes

2 Ibid., p. 20. It is to be noted that I’ll mostly depend on Grady in the exposition of (part of) Kuhn’s theory. And it is only in the next section, in the critique of Grady’s assimilation of the theory to the aesthetic and critical paradigm will I make a direct recourse to Kuhn.
Ibid., p. 23.

Ibid.

Ibid., p.7.

Ibid., p. 22.

Ibid., p. 24.

Ibid., pp. 75-7.


Grady, p. 78.

Ibid., p. 76.

Ibid., p. 82.

See Grady, pp. 79-81.

Ibid., p. 23, 86.

Ibid., p. 207.


Ibid., p. 67.

Marie-Lure Ryan, Possible Worlds, Artificial Intelligence and Narrative Theory (Indiana: University of Bloomington and Indianapolis Press, 1991), p. 3.

Grady, p. 83.

Ibid., p. 76.


See his two provocative studies. The first is: Semiotics of Theatre and Drama (London: Methuen & Co.Ltd., 1980). The second is Shakespeare’s Universe of Discourse: Language Games in the Comedies (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984). Though the first book is about drama in general, yet it voices some suggestions and illuminating examples about Shakespeare’s drama, instances that can be applied to other Shakespearean texts. Its approach is mostly informed by linguistic and semiotic theories of the Prague School and after. The second book heavily draws on speech acts theory.

Grady, p. 226. And it is to be mentioned that these pragmatic and stylistic approaches can be listed under the more general 'Structuralist' methodology. See


30 See, for example, Bruce Boehrer, *Shakespeare Among the Animals: Nature and Society in the Drama of Early Modern England* (New York: Palgrave, 2002.), and Gabriel Egan, *Green Shakespeare: From Ecopolitics to Ecocriticism* (London: Routledge, 2006). If Grady’s work be republished, he has to take into account these studies and assimilate them into the ‘Postmodern theoretical convergence’ for which he blithely theorizes, an assimilation that will addle the already confused convergences mentioned above.


33 Grady, p. 14.

34 Ibid., p. 18.

35 Kuhn, p. 21.

36 Ibid., p. 84.

37 Ibid., p. 52.

38 Ibid., p. 64.

39 See Kuhn, pp. 52-92.

40 Grady, pp. 76-7.

41 Ibid.


43 Ibid., p. 131.


47 In her provocative study of metafiction, Patricia Waugh applies these Formalist criteria to the evolution of metafiction in the postmodern era. According to her, the dynamisms of ‘defamiliarization’ and ‘laying bare the device’ will lead to self-conscious parody in literature. It is this way that literature assures a constant renewal, for things can not remain strange. Thus, metafiction can be viewed as a parody of the conventional forms and traditions of the novel, both realistic and modernist, which have, being long in use, automatized and bluntly familiar, to give way to new forms that ‘strange’ and as yet deautomatized. See Patricia Waugh, *Metafiction: The Theory and Practice of Self-Conscious Fiction* (London: Methuen, 1984), pp.63-8.

48 Bennet, p. 50.

The concept of ‘ideology’ is associated with Marxist thinking. Raymond Williams discerns three meanings given to that concept: (i) a system of beliefs characteristic of a particular class or group, (ii) a system of illusionary beliefs-false ideas or false consciousness-which can be contrasted with true or scientific knowledge, and (iii) the general process of the production of meanings and ideas. For a thorough analysis for this concept, see Williams, pp. 55-71. However, it is the third sense that is mostly implied by Althusser in his formulation of the concept. To Althusser, ‘ideology’ has a deterministic aspect, where it shapes the individual’s conception of reality. We define ourselves by ideology. It forms our attitudes and shapes our identities. It turns individuals into subjects by a process Althusser calls ‘interpellation’ or ‘the hailing of the subject’. It is this deterministic gist that Grady is mainly referring to in this context. For an exposition for Althusser’s concept of ideology, see Bennet (1979), pp. 91-6.

Grady, pp. 21-2.

Ibid., p. 27.

Ibid., p. 204.


Lentricchia, p. 205.

Ibid., p. 198.

Ibid., p. 199.

Ibid., p. 196.

Ibid., p. 197.


**Bibliography**


