Vindicating Synecdoche: A Study in Rhetoric and Cognitive Semantics

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Abstract

Synecdoche is a term used to refer to a classical rhetoric phenomenon that substitutes part for whole, genus for species or vice versa. It appears in different pictures that vary from a scholar to another ranging from a trope to a semantic mechanism. Some scholars identify synecdoche as a separate trope, others see it as a special form of metonymy and some expand it to be a master trope that includes most metonymical relations. More recently, cognitive semantics redefine synecdoche as an independent trope exclusively based on inclusion (taxonomic relations) in that they exclude the part-whole relation and subsume it entirely within metonymy. They, as the researcher sees, make a dangerous step that jeopardizes the concept of synecdoche and transforms it to an anemic trope or a merely semantic mechanism which belongs to a normal functioning of ordinary language. The present paper aims at defending the concept of synecdoche through conforming its independence without losing its fundamental part. Therefore, it tries its best to arrive at semantically based justifications to retrieve the lost part from metonymy to synecdoche. It, thus, announces the independence of synecdoche on condition that it preserves its most tropical part, viz. part-whole relation.

Key words: trope, synecdoche, metonymy, contiguity, inclusion, partonymy, taxonomy.
1. Introduction

A quick look at reference dictionaries tells that synecdoche is the rhetorical name for the phenomenon that substitutes a part for the whole, a genus for species and vice versa. This phenomenon goes back to a certain history ranging from classical rhetoric through new French rhetoric to cognitive semantics. Throughout ages synecdoche has prominently witnessed an intricate process of evolution where it appeared in different pictures fluctuating between rises and falls, splendor and misery, swelling and atrophy. It has significantly played different roles starting from a whole trope in itself with a set of members, through a subtrope frequently subordinated to metonymy, until, more recently, an anemic trope whose part of it was amalgamated with metonymy, namely the part-whole type of synecdoche. This may be one of the reasons that makes much of the work in rhetoric and cognitive linguistics on synecdoche has been characterized by confusion and obscurity.

Synecdoche has scarcely received the attention it deserves, that is, it has seldom been subjected to the same type of interest given to other tropes like metaphor and metonymy. Despite the fluctuation and despite its humble Cinderella status in much of rhetoric and cognitive linguistics, only quite recently synecdoche has drawn attention of some scholars such as Burkhardt (1996), Nerlich and Clarke (1999) Seto (1995, 1999, 2003) and Nerlich (2010). Seto (1995) heralds a new assessment of synecdoche in cognitive semantics when he regards metaphor, metonymy and synecdoche as the three corners of what he calls the ‘cognitive triangle’. In this triangle he describes metaphor as being based on similarity, metonymy on contiguity and synecdoche on inclusion.

Seto (1999) elaborates his view on synecdoche in his article Distinguishing Metonymy from Synecdoche where he redefines it as ‘an independent trope which involves a conceptual transfer phenomenon based on the semantic inclusion between a more comprehensive and a less comprehensive category’. He reserves the notion of synecdoche to a C(ategory) relation transfer which is only based on taxonomic relations. Hence he announces the independence of synecdoche after he excludes the classical part-whole relation and subsumes it under metonymy leaving only semantic inclusion (taxonomic relations) to synecdoche. Then, Seto affirms that after having lost the part-whole relation to metonymy synecdoche seems to have lost its status as a trope and become a general semantic mechanism.

As far as the researcher is concerned, Seto’s treatment of synecdoche seems to some extent confusing. At the time synecdoche becomes an independent trope it loses its figurative status and appears as the least tropical of the three essential tropes: metaphor, metonymy and synecdoche. This is definitely due to the exclusion of the part-whole relation that costs synecdoche its
status as a figure of speech and transforms it to be a mere semantic or stylistic mechanism. Therefore, the present paper aims at vindicating the concept of synecdoche through achieving two goals: (1) confirming the independence of synecdoche on condition that it preserves its main relations and (2) bringing forward semantically based justifications to retrieve the part-whole relation from metonymy.

Section (2) sheds light on the origin of synecdoche, its definitions and its relation to metonymy. Section (3) traces the concept of synecdoche from old rhetoric to the advent of cognitive semantics showing how it has been shifted over the time. Section (4) focuses on defending two aspects of synecdoche: its independence and its part-whole relation. Section (5) presents some conclusions that the study has arrived at.

2. Synecdoche: General Considerations

The word ‘Synecdoche’ is a compound Greek term derived from synekeidóche meaning ‘to receive jointly or in association with’ (from sun, together with, and ekdoche, receive from). It is used as a technical term to refer to the rhetorical figure in which ‘one word receives something from another, which is internally associated with it by the connection of two ideas’ (Bullinger, 1968: 613). According to Oxford English Dictionary, synecdoche is ‘a figure by which a more comprehensive term is used for a less comprehensive or vice versa; as whole for part or part for whole, genus for species or species for genus, etc.’. It also appears in most literary dictionaries as a figure of speech (more specifically a trope) in which a part of something is used to represent the whole or the whole for a part (Barnet et al, 1964:69; Cuddon, 1976: 890 and Murfin and Ray, 2009:507-8). For example,

1. One of his heads was assassinated.
2. The world treated him badly.

In these two sentences, there are two cases of synecdoche. The first is in the word head which stands for one of his men and the second is in the word world which refers to only a very limited number of the people who compose the world.

The rhetorician Lanham(1969: 97) represents the most common tendency to describe synecdoche as ‘the substitution of part for whole, genus for species or vice versa’. This indicates that synecdoche involves ‘a substitution of two terms for each other according to a relation of greater or lesser extension’, that is, one of the
terms used should be more comprehensive than the other. In synecdoche the substitution does not occur randomly but it fundamentally substitutes a significant part of something for the thing itself, that is, the speaker chooses the most important part or the most obvious feature which interests him in a given connection to represent the whole. Hence, one aspect of an object is highlighted while others are excluded. In the following sentences:

3. Put your heads together on that problem.
4. Put your toes together.

the word *heads* refers the parts of the people involved that are being highlighted in the statement. The heads contain the brains, which are relevant to solving a problem whereas the word *toes* is not associated with the mental activity involved in working together to solve a problem. Moreover, the substitution must occur in accordance to the context of situation as showed in the use of the word *hand* in the following example:

5. **All hands** on the deck.

The word *hands* is used deliberately to imply, at least from the captain’s view, that the sailors’ brawns are worth more than their brains.

Synecdoche is closely related to the notion of metonymy in which one thing is represented by another that is commonly associated with it. Gibbs (1994: 322), in his attempt to distinguish metonymy from synecdoche, points out that they ‘are not always clearly distinguishable, since both figures exploit the relationship of larger entities and lesser ones’. Whereas synecdoche substitutes the part for the whole and its terms of reference are concrete, metonymy substitutes the token for the type, or a particular instance, property, or characteristic for the general principle or function. Its terms of reference, as Gibbs (1994: 323) states, often bridge the abstract and the concrete. For instance, people often substitute the *pen* for the author, the *bench* for the law, the *flag* for command, the *ballot box* for democracy, the *crown* for the royal government, and the *bullet* for terrorism. e.g.,

6. They live four doors down the street.
7. They prefer the bullet to the ballet box.

In (6) there is a synecdoche where the word *doors* stands for houses. In (7), there are two metonymies. The first lies in the word *bullet* which denotes terrorism and the second is in the *ballot box* which refers to democracy. This issue will be well illustrated in section (4.1).

The phenomenon of synecdoche has prominently witnessed significant stages of change in its identity and status. Throughout ages, it has been oscillating between rises and falls, splendor and misery, swelling and atrophy. This might clarify the absence of general consensus among scholars about the concept of synecdoche. The present section is to highlight the most influential views about synecdoche from old rhetoric to the advent of the modern cognitive semantics.

3.1 Synecdoche as a Trope

In Antiquity, synecdoche overlaps with the Aristotelian definition of metaphor, that is, it was treated as a part of metaphor. Nerlich (2010: 299) shows that neither the term trope nor the term synecdoche were as yet used by Aristotle but in his Poetics he distinguishes between four classes of metaphors, two types of which would later be included into the range of synecdoche: genus for species and species for genus. She adds that although the term trope was still not mentioned in the work of Quintus Cornificius, three of the figures of speech were to become the cornerstones of classical rhetoric, namely translaio, denominatio and intellectio which can be equated with metaphor, metonymy and synecdoche respectively (Nerlich, 2010: 299-300).

Marcus Fabius Quintilian, the most influential author in the Latin tradition, was the first to talk about changes in meaning brought about by tropes. In his Institutio Oratoria, he treats synecdoche as one of the figures of speech which are of three double types: genus for species and vice versa, the part for the whole and vice versa, and the singular for the plural and vice versa (Mayer, 1993: 71). He also adds a fourth category, later called metalepsis(1), which consists in designating what precedes by what follows and what follows by what precedes (ibid:72; Burkhardt, 2001 as cited in Nerlich, 2010: 300).

Pierre Fontanier was one of the French rhetoricians who wrote many articles about the distinctions among figures of speech. In these articles, he considers synecdoche one of the three, or sometimes four main tropes: metaphor, metonymy, synecdoche and irony and distinguishes between eight of its main types, namely the part for the whole and vice versa, the material for the object, the singular for the plural and vice versa, the genus for the species and vice versa, the

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1 - Nerlich (2010: 300) states that it is difficult to define metalepsis and it is more difficult to find good examples. For her, the best explanation has been provided by Long (2004).
abstract for concrete and the antonomasias (Fontanier, [1821-1827] 1968: 87-97; Burke, 1969 and Meyer, 1993: 83). Having distinguished such various types he draws attention to the fact that during the evolution of rhetoric from Aristotle to the 19th century, the extension of synecdoche varied enormously. Owing to the interacting with these variations in extension, the proliferation of the original figures of speech in classical rhetoric was gradually whittled down by Fontanier and other French rhetoricians such as Dumarsais, Bauzée. Consequently, they were reduced to four (metaphor, metonymy, synecdoche, irony\(^2\)), then three (metaphor, metonymy, synecdoche) (Nerlich, 2010: 300). At this period, the surviving figures, as Dumarsais thought, were distinguished in a way that metonymy and synecdoche are both based on a *liaison* (while ‘dependence’ applies only to synecdoche) which is different from the relation of *resemblance* pertaining to metaphor (For more details see, Räsänen, 2007).

It has been clear that towards the end of the so called classical rhetorical tradition synecdoche was considered one of the tropical figures of speech amongst a minimalist group of four which was then further restricted to three tropes: metaphor, metonymy and synecdoche. Synecdoche itself was seen as subsuming various types which also varied during that time. The ancient kernel of synecdoche, thus, consisted for a long time of two subtypes: the part for whole and the genus for the species (and vice versa), with the part-whole subtype being the most stable part of this typology\(^3\).

### 3.2 Synecdoche as a Subtrope

According to Räsänen (2007: 85), the notion of liaison that associates metonymy with synecdoche seems to be less rigorous than the concept of *contiguity* since the latter term is also better suited to the type of metonymy which is not based on the relation of dependence or, in other words, *inclusion*. Here, Dumarsais’ association of metonymy and synecdoche fits into the categorization of metonymy as a trope of contiguity and/or inclusion. Given that the relation of inclusion falls under the notion of contiguity synecdoche would be included as a type of metonymy. Thus the three surviving tropes were reduced to be two (metaphor and metonymy) where synecdoche has been subordinated as a subtype of metonymy (ibid).

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\(^2\) - Fontanier dropped irony from among other tropes since he considers ‘irony’ not to be a trope, for it consists of several words (and is therefore a ‘figure of expression’ and not of ‘words’, a ‘pseudo-trope’).

\(^3\) - Räsänen (2007: 88) cites Umberto Eco’s indication that ‘As a matter of fact the traditional rhetoric has never satisfactorily explained why a substitution genus/species and a substitution pars/totum are both synecdoche, while all other kinds of substitutions(object/purpose, container/content, cause/effect, material/object, and so on) are called metonymies’.
In the twentieth century, the process of reducing tropes continued under the influence of synchronic linguistics advocated by Ferdinand de Saussure. It had been often done by Roman Jakobson (1956; 1983) who reduced them all to two, metaphor (based on similarity) and metonymy (based on contiguity)⁴. To illustrate this point, Jakobson depended on Saussure’s distinction between syntagmatic relation (in presentia) and paradigmatic relations (in absentia) to define metaphor and metonymy respectively. Accordingly, metaphor is based on the paradigmatic operation of selection or substitution and metonymy on the syntagmatic operation of coordination or combination. Hence, metaphor is said to be based on similarity where we can see something as something else, whereas metonymy is based on contiguity that can be between domains.

Jakobson (1956; 1983) explored synecdoche as a subtype of metonymy. More precisely, one subtype of the older definition of synecdoche based on the part-whole relation is seen as being part of metonymy. Accordingly, the part-whole type of synecdoche was subordinated to metonymy and being one of its aspects whereas the genus-species type of synecdoche was largely forgotten. It can be said that, at this period, synecdoche appeared as a subtrope attributed to metonymy making Jakobson’s work characterized by the dominance given to metaphor and metonymy.

3.3 Synecdoche as a Master Trope

In 1970s, synecdoche was rehabilitated by a group of rhetoricians called Group μ or Group de Liège⁵ (1970; 1977). These rhetoricians regarded synecdoche as a master trope that cannot be reduced to metonymy. It is the basis for metaphor and metonymy themselves, therefore, they defined metaphor

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⁴ According to OED (1961), contiguity, in general, is a relation which allows both for an uninterrupted contact, whether physical or non-physical, and a relation without actual contact, touching without touching.

⁵ Group μ or group de Liège is a group of Belgian rhetoricians (Jacques Dubois, Francis Edline, Jean-Marie Klinkenberg, Philippe Minguet, François Pire, Hadelin Trinon). They inaugurated the new rhetoric in France and Belgium in 1970s and continued for about ten or fifteen years.
as a double synecdoche. In such upsurge of interest, synecdoche was seen as if it had taken its revenge on metaphor and metonymy (Nerlich, 2010:306).

The Group µ were, to some extent, influenced by the Latin tradition where they distinguished between genus to species, species to genus, whole to part, part to whole synecdoches. Accordingly, they postulated various types of synecdoche: synecdoches of the ‘referential mode’ (exploiting what is nowadays called partonomies or meronymies in Cruse’s words) and synecdoches of the ‘semantic mode’ (exploiting taxonomies) (Nerlich and Clarke, 1999:199-200; Nerlich, 2010: 306-7). Schofer and Rice (1977), who worked in the French tradition of new rhetoric, confirmed the work of the Group µ when they described synecdoche as being expanded to have other types of relations as showed in their claim:

Synechdoche is characterized by a semantic or referential relationship of inclusion made possible by the fact that one of the signifieds is also a semantic feature of the other signified. Whereas we eliminated all but causal relationships from metonymy, synecdoche is expanded here to include not only the part for the but also the container for the contained. (ibid: 141)

It can be easily noticed that synecdoche, at this period, appears as a major trope that includes its classical relations and other metonymical ones. Nerlich and Clarke (1999: 200) summarize the situation well when they write ‘whereas synecdoche was absorbed by metonymy in the case of Jakobson, synecdoche absorbed part of metonymy in the case of the Group µ’.

3.4 Synecdoche as a Semantic Mechanism

Unlike its early revival in French ‘new rhetoric’, synecdoche resurfaced in the English and German speaking countries at the end of 20th century. It appeared first in Lakoff and Johnsons’ (1980) seminal book Metaphor We Live By in which they studied it as one aspect of metonymy. Lakoff and Johnson claimed that ‘we are including as a special case of metonymy what traditional rhetoricians have called synecdoche, where the part stands for the whole’ (1980: 36). This claim shows that they followed Jakobson in his definition of synecdoche, which, for them, is a special case of metonymy. It indicates that metaphor and metonymy based, as in
Jakobson’s work, on similarity and contiguity respectively, predominated once again circles of linguistic research (Nerlich, 2010: 309).

Seto (1995) attempts to off-set Lakoff and Johnson’s claim that our conceptual system is largely metaphorical when he states that metonymy and synecdoche are, or at least may be, just as basic. He tackles metaphor, metonymy and synecdoche as the three corners of what he calls the ‘cognitive triangle’ where metaphor is based on similarity, metonymy on contiguity and synecdoche on inclusion. In this triangle, Seto (1995: 3-4; 1999: 91-2) sees metonymy as a real world relation based on any type of contiguity\(^6\) whereas synecdoche is a category relation based on semantic inclusion which, for him, means the relation between a more comprehensive category and a less comprehensive category. Hence, he excludes from synecdoche the classical part-whole relation in the physical world and subsumes it under metonymic contiguity, leaving only semantic inclusion to synecdoche, that is the relation inside or between categories. On this basis, Seto (ibid: 6-7) categorizes synecdoche into the following types:

1. genus-for-species:
   - mortal (→ a human being)
   - jeans (→ blue jeans [AmE])
   - drug (→ marijuana, cocaine)
   - drink (→ drink alcohol → drink alcoholic beverages)

2. species-for-genus:
   - to earn one’s daily bread
   - walkman (Sony’s Walkman → any personal stero)
   - sellotape (BrE)/scotch tape (AmE) (→ any sticky thin clear tape) species (and many other brand-names)

3. type-token
   - This jacket is our best-selling item. (→ This type of jacket)
   - We both drive a Honda Accord (→ two tokens of the same type of car)

After having categorized synecdoche into these types, Seto (1995: 7) discusses a

\[^6\] Contiguity, according to Seto (1999: 95), refers to ‘spatio-temporal contiguity between two entities in the world’. In this sense, contiguity covers a wider range of relations than partonomy. It is worthy to note that this sense is one, presumably the most important, of the several different senses that Jakobson (1956) gives to the term ‘contiguity’.
lot of examples and then states that

In advanced countries a TV means a color TV and a fridge means an electronic refrigerator. That this is possible is, I suppose, due to the mechanism of the genus for-species synecdoche. This kind of synecdoche may be related to the so-called maxim of quantity. If this is possible, it seems reasonable to suppose that the genus-for-species synecdoche is not a special figure of speech, but a very general semantic mechanism which governs a wide range of language use .......

Seto, here, draws attention to two crucial points. First, the type of synecdoche that substitutes the genus for the species is at one and the same time the most common and least ‘tropical’ and ‘the most trivially true’ as Nerlich (2010: 313) confirms. Second, being related to the maxim of quantity means that the genus-for-species type of synecdoche is always true in that it does not involve violating the maxim of quality as in the case of metaphor where the truth-function of a word is undermined.

Examining more examples, Nerlich and Clarke (1999: 206-7) find out that the genus for species synecdoche seems to be the most common type of synecdoche especially in any type of ‘official’ register, such as ‘police speech’ or the style of public announcements. Since this type of synecdoche is always true and it is easier and safer to use a generic term rather than a specific one, one can hear utterances such as,

8. I apprehended a person/vehicle on the premises.

Nerlich and Clarke (1999: 207) point out that such uses of synecdoche may strike us as somewhat odd, but they are generally not perceived as ‘figures of speech’. They are actually no more than stylistic variations that can be used ‘as an instrument to avoid introducing too many and especially too specific referents’, in Dirven’s (1993: 22) words. This maintains what Klinkenberg (1983: 291) had already pointed out that the use of synecdoche seems to belong to the normal functioning of ordinary language.

Finally, Nerlich and Clarke (1999) support Seto’s (1995) conclusion when they state that the nature of the genus for species synecdoche is certainly the least tropical of the three master tropes: metaphor, metonymy and synecdoche. This shows that cognitive semanticists are unanimous on the fact that having lost its most figurative part, the part-whole synecdoche, to metonomy, synecdoche thus
seems to have lost at one and the same time its status as a figure of speech and become a general semantic or stylistic mechanism which could be studied in the context of semantic relations, such as synonymy and hyponymy (Nerlich and Clarke, 1999: 206).

4. In Vindication of Synecdoche

Looking back at the history of synecdoche one can easily see how much it is debatable. The debate probably raises from two confusing inquiries that have been treated differently by different scholars. They reside in ‘is synecdoche distinguished from metonymy? how?’ and in ‘is the part-whole relation attributed to synecdoche or to metonymy? why?’. Consequently, we have seen that some scholars identify synecdoche as a separate trope, some see it as a special form of metonymy and others expand it to be a master trope that includes most metonymical relations. We have also recognized how cognitive semanticists treated synecdoche according to their logically based framework. For them, synecdoche is an independent trope exclusively based on inclusion (taxonomy relations) in that they exclude the part-whole relation and subsume it entirely within metonymy. They, as the researcher sees, make a dangerous step that jeopardizes the concept of synecdoche and transforms it to an anemic trope or a merely semantic mechanism which belongs to a normal functioning of ordinary language. In fact, though they have got synecdoche out of its Cinderella’s status they have abstracted its most figurative part, the part-whole relation and regarded it as a mere semantic mechanism. Figuratively speaking, despite their success to get the Cinderella out of her solitude after a long time of neglect, unfortunately they have introduced her with one of her pair of shoes.

This section intends to confirm the independence of synecdoche through discussing attempts to distinguish it from metonymy especially that made by Seto. It also tries hard to bring forward semantically based justifications to retrieve the lost part of the reduced synecdoche, viz. the part-whole relation.

4.1 Independence of Synecdoche

It has been argued that the boundary lines between cognitive domains are fuzzy; that is why there is a lack of agreement about the conceptual distinctions between various tropes. With regard to synecdoche and metonymy the issue of distinguishing them seems to be very intricate. Yet it is not impossible. For example, one of the early attempts to distinguish synecdoche from metonymy is Fontanier’s (1968, cited in Zhang, 2005: 182). He argues that metonymy takes place through relations of correlation or correspondence; synecdoche takes place
through relations of connection. By correspondence, Fontanier refers to the relation that brings together two objects, each of which constitutes ‘an absolutely separate whole’. In the relationship of connection, the two objects form an ensemble or form a physical or metaphysical whole; the existence or idea of one is included in the existence or idea of the other. The relationship of connection has many species: part to whole, material to thing, one to many, species to genus, abstract to concrete, species to individual, etc. According to Fontanier, correspondence and connection, thus, designate two relationships as distinct as exclusion (as with metonymy) and inclusion (as with synecdoche).

A nearly similar point of view is that of Wodak et.al. (1999: 43) when they state that metonymy involves replacing the name of a referent by the name of an entity which is closely associated with it in either concrete or abstract terms. On this basis, metonymies can be classified into a number of groups depending on the relationship between the two involved adjacent conceptual fields. For example, the words *pen* and *sword* are used as metonymies to be substituted for ‘word’ and ‘war’ respectively.

9. The pen is mightier than the sword.

Synecdoche, as Wodak et.al.(ibid) describe, ‘replaces the name of a referent by the name of another referent which belongs to the same field of meaning and which is either semantically wider or semantically narrower’. Hebron (2004: 149-50) supports this view in his claim that whereas metonymy involves a substitute operating between separate but related concepts synecdoche occurs between two elements of the same concept. More precisely, in synecdoche the speaker refers to a thing by naming a part of it, or a greater thing to which it belongs. With synecdoche, the relationship between the two things involved is either part-and-whole, genus-and species or vice versa, that is, one thing is a part of the other. Here it can be said that it is definitely true that both metonymy and synecdoche involve substituting of one thing for another related to it but the former associates two different entities whereas the latter associates an entity with its parts. For example,

10. Her heart ruled her head.
11. He paid the workers 5$ per head.

In sentence (10), the word *heart* substitutes for ‘feeling’; the word *head* substitutes for ‘reasoning’. Heart and feeling are two different concepts, and head and reasoning are another two different ones. The reason for these substitutes is that *heart* is generally acknowledged to correlate to our feeling, and *head*, to our reasoning. Therefore, *heart* and *head* in the sentence are metonymically used. But
the word *head*, in (11), means something different since it substitutes for ‘worker’ instead of ‘reasoning’: He paid each worker 5$. The relation between head and the body is that of part and whole. These two uses of *head* affirm that sometimes the same word can be used as metonymy when it associates two different entities and as synecdoche when it associates an entity with its parts.

Similarly, Berdin (1984: 54) draws a distinction between synecdoche and metonymy built upon the distinction between structural relations and extrinsic relations. He says

> Synecdochic relations are structural, and metonymical relations are extrinsic- relations, in the one case, between particulars and their parts, and in the other case between particulars and other particulars…….It is of great importance, though, to note that what is taken to be the particular in any given case is dependent on the context, and not necessarily upon some inherent nature in things.

For illustration, the word *wheel* is a synecdoche when it is used to refer to an automobile; but if a racing driver is given the nickname ‘Wheel’, this is a metonymy. In one case the particular is an automobile, and wheels are part of it, structurally related to the automobile as part of whole. In the other case, wheels are a particular, and are extrinsically related to the driver, who is another particular. Berdin also notes that

> in the synecdochic relation of genus to species, the concept of the genus is taken as a particular, even though it is a concept.

One reason is that, when we begin to analyze a concept into its constituents, its having those constituents is the having of certain properties.

For example, the word ‘mortal’ has the property of including the extension of the concept man; it may be said to instantiate the having of that property as a particular instantiates a universal (ibid). It can be stated here that the above mentioned points of view share the same argument that we may have synecdoche when the substitute occurs within one domain whereas metonymy occurs when the substitute occurs between two separate domains.

A logically oriented attempt to distinguish synecdoche from other tropes is that of Seto (1995) when describes it as a third member in a triplet of essential tropes, namely metaphor, metonymy and synecdoche. In this triangle, he categorizes these tropes in such a way in which metaphor is based on similarity,
metonymy on contiguity and synecdoche on inclusion. Therefore, he excludes from synecdoche the part-whole relation and subsumes it under metonymy, leaving only semantic inclusion to synecdoche, that is the relation inside or between categories.

Seto (1999) elaborates this view in his article *Distinguishing Metonymy from Synecdoche* where he restricts the uses of ‘whole’ and ‘part’ to partonomy and regards it just as one of several contiguous relations related to metonymy. He also points out that synecdoche, if it is to be a consistent category, should take only taxonomy, leaving partonomy to metonymy because taxonomy is equivalent to the C-relation while partonomy is one type of the E-relation. He illustrates these types of relations in his definitions of metonymy and synecdoche. For him, metonymy refers to ‘a referential transfer phenomenon based on the spatio-temporal contiguity as conceived by the speaker between an entity and another in the (real) world’ (ibid: 91). Synecdoche, on the other hand, denotes ‘a conceptual transfer phenomenon based on the semantic inclusion between a more comprehensive and a less comprehensive category’ (ibid: 93). According to this definition, synecdoche occurs when there is a transfer either from a less comprehensive category (species) to a more comprehensive (genus) as in (12) or from a more comprehensive (genus) to a less comprehensive (species) as in (13).

12. To earn one’s (daily) *bread*.
13. I have a *temperature*. (fever)

After having made such limitations, Seto discusses the independence of synecdoche ending his article with the conclusion that ‘synecdoche, which is C-related, should be independent from metonymy, which is E-related’.

On the basis of the above views, it can be said that though synecdoche and metonymy are not always clearly distinguishable rhetoricians, literary theorists, and linguists could draw clear demarcation lines between them according to their own theoretical bases. On the part of Fontanier, Wodak et.al and Hebron, they focus on the substitution whether it occurs between two different but related things or a thing with its parts. Berdin (1984: 54) exploit the distinction between structural and extrinsic relations to distinguish synecdoche from metonymy adding his reference to the importance of context of situation in determining the particular itself.

In the framework of cognitive semantics, Seto keeps far from either text or context of situation focusing only on the distinction between referential and taxonomic relations to distinguish synecdoche from metonymy. Though the researcher acknowledges Seto’s effort to assure the independence of synecdoche
she hardly admits to restricting a whole trope to a certain semantic relation. She sees that the exclusion of part-whole relation from synecdoche is a dangerous step that jeopardizes the concept of synecdoche and transforms it to an anemic trope or a merely semantic mechanism which belongs to a normal functioning of ordinary language. Therefore, the following section is devoted to discuss the issue of excluding the part-whole relation.

4.2 Synecdoche and Part-Whole Relation

Whether synecdoche includes the part-whole relation has been a matter of a considerable debate. Factually results from the relation between part-whole (partonomy) relations and genus-species (taxonomy) relations. Some scholars derive partonomy from taxonomy, others consider class-inclusion relations as subtype of part-whole relations. And on the other hand, some lexical semanticists consider partonomy and taxonomy to be basic sense relations. For instance, Cruse (1986) equates part-whole relation with taxonomy so he claims that ‘any taxonomy can be thought of in part-whole terms[…] a class can be looked on as a whole whose parts are its sub-classes (ibid: 179). Therefore, no meaningful distinction can be drawn between metonymy and synecdoche, and thus synecdoche is, in fact, seen as a special case of metonymy. Consequently, Lakoff and Johnson (1980: 36) state that ‘we are including as a special case of metonymy what traditional rhetoricians have called synecdoche, where the part stands for the whole’.

Seto (1999: 101) criticizes this point of view and describes it as ‘a dangerous step that might jeopardize the concepts of, and the basic distinction between, taxonomy and partonomy’. Therefore, he rejects the traditional definition of synecdoche, which, according to Lakoff and Johnson (1980), is a special case of metonymy inquiring ‘why so ‘special’?’. For him, this definition also raises uncertainty in defining metonymy that can only be resolved if a clear distinction is made between the two ways in which the terms ‘part’ and ‘whole’ can be used. It means that recognizing partonomy as distinct from taxonomy would be a first step towards a properly restricted sense of metonymy. Consequently, Seto excludes from synecdoche the classical part-whole relation in the physical world and subsumes it under metonymic contiguity leaving only semantic inclusion to synecdoche, that is the relation inside or between categories. Thus, the notion of metonymy is extended to include referential transfer based on partonomy and other contiguous relations leaving only categorical transfer to synecdoche. In an attempt to clarify this point, Seto cites the following examples which he considers them two examples of metonymy:

13. Little Red Riding Hood
14. Bluebeard
Little Red Riding Hood refers to the girl who always wears the hood so named. The hood is not a part of the girl, but just in contact with her. Bluebeard, on the other hand, refers to the man who kills his wives. The beard is a real part of him, not just a false beard he might wear. Seto sees that the difference between the two expressions is factually negligible and theoretically trivial. Nevertheless, traditional rhetoric would judge that there is metonymy in the first because the hood is not a part of the girl and there is a synecdoche in the second because the beard, a part, stands for the killer, the whole. Accordingly, he rejects the traditional rhetoric concept of synecdoche and analyzes them as two metonymies depending on the notion of ‘contiguity’ which includes the part-whole relation and other contiguous relations to characterize metonymy (1999: 94-5). Thus, this justifies his insistence on drawing the sharp line between partonymy and taxonomy in his attempt to distinguish synecdoche from metonymy.

The researcher would like to stop here to discuss some points. The first concerns Seto’s analysis of the examples (14 and 15). The former is undoubtedly a metonymy because it describes the girl by the name of some conspicuous accompaniment which is regarded as one of the contiguous relations that associates the girl with the Little Red Riding Hood itself. With regard to the latter, it is hardly judged as synecdoche even by traditional rhetoric. This may be due to Cruse’s (1986) view that not any part can work as a successful partonomy or meronymy as he calls. Cruse (2011: 138) mentions that ‘as a conceptual relation, meronymy has core realizations and peripheral realizations’, that is, a number of features should appear to contribute to ‘goodness of exemplar’ for such lexical relation(7). He illustrates that some parts are necessary to their wholes, whereas others are optional. For instance, although a ‘beard’ is part of a face, breads are not necessary to faces. This is unlike ‘fingers’ which are necessary to hands. Hence, we can safely conclude that bluebeard does not appear as a part-whole synecdoche at all but it is pure metonymy that associates this feature to whom kills his wives. It is also worthy to note that in addition to be a successful partonomy it must be selected in accordance to the context of situation as illustrated in example (5).

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7 - According to Cruse(2011: 138-40), there are many features that a lexical item should have to be a good example of ‘meronymy’ as Cruse names. They are as follows: necessity, integrality, discreteness, motivation and congruence.
The second point which is the most crucial one is that when Seto (1999) excludes the part-whole relation from synecdoche he extracts its most tropical part. As a result, synecdoche has been reduced to be a category relation based on semantic inclusion between a more comprehensive category and a less comprehensive category. After having lost the part-whole relation to metonymy synecdoche, thus, seems to have lost its status as a trope and become merely a general semantic mechanism. This shows that Seto, in this step, assures the distinction between taxonomy and partonomy and preserves them from being overlapped but he clearly jeopardizes the concept of synecdoche itself and makes it fall as a victim to the distinction made between partonomy and taxonomy. Hence, we remain looking for a theoretical justification to recover anemic synecdoche.

Cruse (2011) modifies his view about meronymy when he defines it as ‘another relation of inclusion which is the conceptual reflex of the part-whole relation between individual referents’ (ibid: 137). He points out that meronomy represents an interesting parallel with hyponymy on condition that they must not, of course, be confused. For instance, a dog is not a part of an animal, and a finger is not a kind of a hand. In both cases there is inclusion in different directions according to whether one takes an extensional or an intentional view. A hand physically includes the fingers (we are not dealing with classes here, but individuals); but the meaning of finger somehow incorporates the sense of hand. Cruse, here, gives us an appropriate clue to reserve synecdoche as an independent trope based on inclusion retrieving the part-whole relation as one of the inclusion relations and make it a purely synecdochic specific relation.

5. Conclusions

The paper has concluded the following:
1. Having scrutinized the history of synecdoche one can easily notice how much it is debatable. It shows that not only is there no a consistent definition of synecdoche, there is also neither consensus on the main types of synecdoche nor on its relation to metonymy.

2. The fluctuation of synecdoche is not factually attributed to the nature of the phenomenon itself but it is almost attached to the lack of agreement among rhetoricians and linguists who work within completely different theoretical bases.
3. Despite little consensus among rhetoricians, literary theorists and linguists in distinguishing synecdoche from metonymy many scholars contributed to draw clear demarcation lines between them.

4. In the framework of cognitive semantics, synecdoche has been best distinguished from metonymy by Seto (1995) when he describes synecdoche as a third member in the triplet of essential tropes where metaphor is based on similarity, metonymy on contiguity and synecdoche on inclusion.

5. As much as the research paper appreciates Seto’s (1999) contribution to affirm the independence of synecdoche it hardly accepts his attempt to exclude the part-whole relation and subsumes it under metonymic contiguity leaving only semantic inclusion to synecdoche that is taxonomic relations inside or between categories.

6. It has been seen that the exclusion of part-whole relation from synecdoche is a dangerous step that jeopardizes the concept of synecdoche and transforms it to an anemic trope or a merely semantic mechanism which belongs to a normal functioning of ordinary language.

7. Despite of the cognitive significance of drawing a sharp line between partonomy and taxonomy it cannot be used as the only criterion to distinguish synecdoche from metonymy and maintain their independence from each other.

8. It is very oppressive to restrict the notion of a whole a trope to a mere semantic mechanism since synecdoche like other rhetorical phenomena raises from a deliberate investment of all meaning components such as the semantic relation involved and any possible aspect of context of situation.

9. Although interpreting synecdoche is beyond the goals of the present paper we absolutely agree with Berdin (1984: 54) in his reference to the context of situation and its role to determine whether the particular is a case of synecdoche or metonymy. This definitely indicates that the context of situation is a determinant factor in the process of the production and comprehension synecdoche.

10. The research paper finds in Cruse’s claim that ‘meronymy is another relation of inclusion that represents an interesting parallel with hyponymy’ an appropriate semantic justification to retrieve the lost part from metonymic contiguity and then
recover the anemic trope. His claim helps to achieve the two main goals: first, preserving synecdoche as an independent trope based on inclusion and second, retrieve the part-whole relation under the umbrella of inclusion to sustain this trope with its most tropical part viz. its part-whole relation.

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دفاع عن المجاز المرسل: دراسة في البلاغة وعلم الدلالة المعرفي
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المستخلص

يشير مصطلح "المجاز المرسل" إلى ظاهرة بLAGية موغلة في القدم. يستبدل فيها الجزء الكل أو الجنس النوع والعكس صحيح. وتمظهرت بصور مختلفة من مفكر لآخر متراوحة بين كونها آداية بيان إلى كونها آلية دلالية. فمنهم من يعدوها آداية بيان مستقلة ومنهم من يراها نوعًا خاصًا من الكتابية والأخر يعدها أداء بيان أساسيًا لمعظم العلاقات المجازية التي تقوم عليها الكتابية. وقد عرف علماء الدلالة المعرفيين مؤخرا المجاز المرسل بأنه آداة بيان مستقلة قائمة على آليات التضمن أو علاقة (ال الجنس بالنوع) فقط، أي أنهم اقتطعوا علاقة (الجزء بالكل) من المجاز المرسل ووضعوها تحت الكتابية. وبناءً على عملية الفصل والاقطاع التي قام بها الدلاليين المعرفين فقد تحول المجاز المرسل إلى آداة بيان واهنة أو هي ليست أكثر من آلية دلالية تظهر ضمن وظائف اللغة الإدبيات. وهنا يحاول البحث جاهدا تقدمًا فصلاً لمفهوم المجاز المرسل عبر العصور متفحصا الآمس البلاغية والدلالة وراء تأرجح وتقلب هذه الآداب بين الإشراق والأفل، الأفلاك، التضخم والضمور طارحا تساؤلا يستقصيه في جوهر المجاز المرسل إن كان في حقيقة الأمر آداة بيان أم آلية دلالية متناولة في الاستخدام اليومي للغة الإنجليزية.

وقد يدافع البحث عن مفهوم المجاز المرسل من خلال التأكيد على استقلاليته من دون ضياع عنصره الأساسي وهو علاقة الجزء بالكل. ويهدف البحث من ذلك إلى التوصل لأسباب وتبريرات دلالية تسترجع العنصر المفقود من الكتابية إلى المجاز المرسل. وهذا يؤكد البحث استقلالية المجاز المرسل شرطة مع احتفاظ بعنصره المجازي المهم وهو علاقة الجزء بالكل.